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ARTICLES
REEVALUATING SCHOOL SEARCHES
FOLLOWING SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE REFORMS
Josh Gupta-Kagan*
The U.S. Supreme Court held in New Jersey v. T.L.O. that school officials
could search students without a warrant and with only reasonable suspicion,
not probable cause, because of schools’ need for discipline and the
relationship between educators and students. That case belongs to a body of
Fourth Amendment cases involving, in T.L.O.’s terms, “special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” What Fourth Amendment
standard, then, governs searches involving one of the roughly 20,000 school
resource officers (SROs) in American schools? Most state courts to decide
the issue in the 1990s and 2000s found that T.L.O. applied to SRO-involved
searches, likening SROs to school officials and drawing a line between SROs
and other police officers.
Reforms largely enacted in the 2010s, in contrast, draw a line between
school officials and SROs, emphasizing that SROs are law enforcement
officers, not school disciplinarians. Reflecting the consensus that law
enforcement responses to school misbehavior harm children, these reforms
limit SRO involvement to more serious crimes or immediate safety risks.
This Article is the first to explore how these recent reforms undermine
earlier cases applying T.L.O. to SROs. These recent reforms place SROs on
the law enforcement side of the “special needs” line. This analysis also
shows how searches conducted under policies requiring schools to turn over
evidence of criminal activity to law enforcement transform the character of
searches conducted by school officials into law enforcement searches.
Finally, this Article offers a doctrinal path to limiting warrantless school
searches to narrower circumstances, thus letting authorities respond to the
risk of deadly weapons at schools while limiting the risk that reduced Fourth
Amendment protections will contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline.

* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. The author would like
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INTRODUCTION
School resource officers (SROs)1 are now a regular feature in American
public schools. After growing substantially in the 1990s and early 2000s in
response to the early-1990s peak crime rate and mass shootings at schools,
there are now roughly 20,000 sworn police officers stationed at schools.2 At
the same time, policies that toughened school disciplinary and law
enforcement consequences for school rule and criminal law violations took
effect, causing what became known as the school-to-prison pipeline. SROs’
presence was an important part of this story. SROs became involved in
school misbehavior—such as fights and disobedience—that school officials
would have handled in prior generations, and SROs increasingly arrested and
charged students for such incidents.3 SROs also became involved in searches
of students for evidence of crimes—both by searching students directly and
through policies requiring school officials to turn over the fruits of their
searches to SROs. In the past, a student found to have stolen money from
another student or with a joint in his pocket could have been subject to school
discipline—say, detention or suspension, with a requirement to return stolen
items or participate in substance-abuse counseling—but now also faces
arrest.
SRO involvement in searches raises difficult questions under the Fourth
Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. T.L.O.4 in
1985—before the sharp increase in SRO presence in schools—and held that
primary and secondary school officials could search students without a
warrant and with only reasonable suspicion of a school rule or criminal law
violation.5 The Court emphasized schools’ need for discipline and the
relationship between educators and students in crafting this exception to
normal Fourth Amendment rules, and it explicitly avoided any decisions
regarding school searches conducted by officers or by school officials “in

1. Local jurisdictions use a range of alternative terminology for police officers assigned
to schools, including “school liaison officer” and “school board officer.” See, e.g., People v.
Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ill. 1996) (using the term “liaison officer”). This Article uses
the term “school resource officer” and its acronym because it is the most common term and
for ease of reference. This Article uses that term even when cited authorities use alternative
terms, with the exception of quotations.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Implicit Racial Bias and Students’ Fourth Amendment
Rights, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 36) (explaining how “intense
surveillance measures,” including SRO involvement in school searches and discipline, “are a
component of involving more students in the criminal justice system”).
4. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
5. Id. at 341–42.
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conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies.”6 That
nondecision is unsurprising because T.L.O. belongs to a body of Fourth
Amendment cases involving “special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement” that justify exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and
probable cause requirements.7 That phrase—coined in Justice Harry
Blackmun’s influential T.L.O. concurrence and used in a series of later
Supreme Court cases—emphasizes the need to draw lines between law
enforcement and school discipline searches. Drawing that line in SROinvolved searches became difficult for state courts.
Although many state courts still have not decided the question nearly
three-and-a-half decades after T.L.O., the majority that have apply T.L.O.’s
reduced Fourth Amendment protections to SRO-involved searches.8 These
decisions, reached mostly in the 1990s and early 2000s, hold that SROs are
different than other law enforcement officers and they, unlike most officers,
are not subject to normal Fourth Amendment limitations. Several leading
cases described SROs as school officials for Fourth Amendment purposes in
all instances.9 Other cases effectively did the same, construing SROs as part
of a school team and thus entitled to the same Fourth Amendment standard
as other members of that team in individual instances.10
These cases draw a line between SROs and other law enforcement officers.
Other officers perform law enforcement searches, while SROs are on the
school-discipline side of the line—even if they are sworn law enforcement
officers who not only have power to arrest children but, in the relevant cases,
do in fact arrest and charge children. This line-drawing has been strongly
criticized by academics and some courts.11 The roles of SROs blurred lines
to some extent: many SROs could and did engage in school discipline in
addition to law enforcement duties.12
Reforms largely enacted in the 2010s make it easier to draw a line between
school officials and SROs for Fourth Amendment purposes.13 Responding
to concerns about the school-to-prison pipeline and SROs’ role in it, reforms
emphasize that SROs are law enforcement officers, not school
disciplinarians, and should not become involved in school discipline.14
Given the harms that come from a law enforcement response, especially to
more minor misbehavior, these reforms posit that SROs should only become
6. Id. at 341 n.7.
7. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. See infra Part I.C.1.
10. See infra Part I.C.2.
11. See infra Part I.D.
12. To be clear, whether such policing behaviors that mix law enforcement and school
discipline should qualify for T.L.O.’s rule is debatable, and, in my view, doubtful, because
SROs’ roles in investigating crimes and arresting students should have placed them on the law
enforcement side of the special needs doctrine’s line. Nonetheless, courts adopting the
majority rule could in the 1990s and early 2000s logically point to such mixed roles to justify
treating SROs like school officials.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Parts III.C–D.
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involved when more serious crimes occur or when immediate security risks
exist.15 Such reforms are evident in federal administrative guidance; some
state statutes, regulations, and administrative guidance; as well as many local
memoranda of understanding between school districts and law enforcement
agencies.16
This Article is the first to explore how these 2010s reforms undermine the
idea from 1990s and 2000s cases that SROs engage in school discipline just
like school officials and thus undermine a basic pillar of the majority rule
regarding SRO-involved searches. These reforms show that SROs have a
law enforcement role, which places them solidly on the law enforcement side
of T.L.O.’s “special needs” line. Building on prior critiques of the majority
rule, this argument shows why courts should refuse to apply T.L.O.’s
reasonable suspicion standard and exception to the warrant requirement to
school searches involving SROs.
These recent reforms also help explain why many school searches not
directly involving SROs should not qualify for T.L.O.’s exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements. A variety of laws and policies now
require schools to turn over evidence of criminal activity to law enforcement,
which transforms the character of searches conducted by school officials.17
Consider a teenager suspected of possessing a cell phone stolen from another
child. A search conducted by an SRO for that cell phone and a search
conducted by a school administrator under a policy requiring her to turn over
evidence of crimes to the SRO both lead to the SRO having evidence of the
crime and, often, arresting the child. The Court in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston,18 a post-T.L.O. special needs case, held that such disclosures of
evidence to law enforcement render the special needs standard
inapplicable.19 Recent reforms defining SROs’ roles as law enforcement
mean that disclosing evidence to them represents a plain policy choice to
transform a school search into a law enforcement matter. It entangles school
officials with law enforcement nearly as much as including law enforcement
in the search itself and should trigger Ferguson’s result.
These arguments are not without risks; declining to apply T.L.O. to school
searches entangled with law enforcement could make it more difficult to
search for weapons—a result many courts might find intolerable in an era of
far-too-frequent school shootings. This Article also offers an alternative
doctrinal path to permitting warrantless searches with less than probable
cause when there is reason to suspect deadly weapons are present in school.20
Such situations call for Terry searches—searches intended to eliminate an
immediate risk to individuals’ safety, and whose scope is tailored to the risk
at issue.21 Such an approach is far more targeted to legitimate safety aims
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.B.
532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 84.
See infra notes 390–400 and accompanying text.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
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than applying T.L.O. wholesale, and it limits the risk that reduced Fourth
Amendment standards will continue to contribute to the school-to-prison
pipeline.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the doctrinal background.
It analyzes T.L.O., its holding regarding searches by school officials without
law enforcement entanglement, and its implications for cases involving such
entanglement. Part I also explores how subsequent Supreme Court schoolsearch cases address related issues but do not change the underlying analysis,
and explains and critiques the majority rule. Part II summarizes the postT.L.O. growth of SROs and critiques of SROs’ roles as fueling the school-toprison pipeline. Part III describes and illustrates the recent reforms that draw
lines between law enforcement and school discipline, and limit SROs’ role
to law enforcement functions. Part IV argues that these reforms require
reexamination of state rules permitting SRO searches under reasonable
suspicion rather than probable cause and without a warrant. Finally, Part V
explores relatively narrow options to permit authorities to search for weapons
at school to keep schools safe without raising the same school-to-prison
pipeline concerns as broader permission for SRO searches.
I. HOW SROS OFTEN ESCAPED REGULAR FOURTH AMENDMENT
LIMITATIONS
No U.S. Supreme Court ruling definitively states the Fourth Amendment
standard that applies to searches by or involving school resource officers.
The Court decided its leading school-search case before SROs were as
common as they are today, and subsequent Supreme Court school-search
cases did not involve SROs.22 The Court has clearly held that school officials
“acting alone and on their own authority” do not generally need to seek a
warrant and may search based on reasonable suspicion, but it explicitly
avoided any ruling on searches “conducted by school officials in conjunction
with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies” or by law enforcement
officers themselves.23 In that vacuum, most state courts to decide the issue
have distinguished SROs from other police officers or construed searches
involving SROs as ones initiated or primarily led by school officials.24 The
majority of states that have decided these issues, therefore, apply the lowered
Fourth Amendment standard for school officials to SROs.25
This Part describes how this majority rule came to be, as well as contrary
rules in other states and the critical commentary that the majority rule has
engendered. Neither Supreme Court nor state decisions have held that
students always have a reduced expectation of privacy. Crucially, the
22. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009)
(explaining that an assistant principal and administrative assistant conducted the search of a
student’s bag).
23. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985). The Court cited a federal district
court case holding that a police search at school required probable cause. Id. (citing Picha v.
Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219–21 (N.D. Ill. 1976)).
24. See infra Part I.C.1.
25. See infra Part I.C.
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majority rule depends on analogizing SROs’ roles to school officials’ and
distinguishing those roles from other police officers.
A. A Lower Fourth Amendment Standard for School Officials’
Unique Roles
In T.L.O., after an assistant principal searched a student’s purse and found
marijuana,26 the subsequent juvenile court case presented a series of Fourth
Amendment questions whose answers—or nonanswers—from the Court
form the foundation for present law regarding school searches. The Court
made clear that students have some meaningful expectation of privacy at
school, protected by the Fourth Amendment, but that the relationship
between students and educators and the goals of maintaining discipline
within schools justify an exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements. The Court applied that exception to school officials,27 but it
left unanswered whether the exception extends to searches by or involving
law enforcement at school.28 Importantly, the Court’s analysis distinguishes
searches by school officials from searches by law enforcement. That
distinction is particularly evident in T.L.O.’s concurring opinions, which
were written by justices whose votes were essential to forming a majority
and whose analysis shaped later cases.
The first question presented by T.L.O. was whether the Fourth Amendment
protected students from searches by educators at all.29 New Jersey argued
that it did not because teachers could not be limited by the Fourth
Amendment and because students lacked Fourth Amendment privacy
interests.30 The Court rejected both ideas, holding that the Fourth
Amendment governs school searches.31 The State emphasized the difference
between law enforcement and school searches and argued “that the
Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out
by law enforcement officers” and not public school officials.32 This
argument was easy to reject based on a long history, dating to the nineteenth
century, in which the Court applied the Fourth Amendment to searches by
civil authorities.33 The Court further held that school officials exercise state
authority, not authority delegated by parents, so constitutional limitations
must govern them as they govern any state actor.34

26. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
27. Id. at 341.
28. See id. at 341 n.7.
29. Id. at 333.
30. Id. at 334.
31. Id. at 336–37.
32. Id. at 334.
33. Id. at 335.
34. Id. at 336. In addition to prior cases treating school officials as state authorities, the
Court emphasized compulsory education laws and the reality that school officials implement
state educational and disciplinary policies to explain why it treats those officials as state actors.
Id. at 336–37.
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The State also argued that children at school had no reasonable expectation
of privacy because that was “incompatib[le]” with “the maintenance of a
sound educational environment” and because children did not need to have
any personal items with them at school.35 Again, the Court easily rejected
the argument by noting the plainly legitimate reasons that students would
carry private items to school—“the necessaries of personal hygiene” and
“such nondisruptive yet highly personal items as photographs, letters, and
diaries.”36 Searching a child or a closed bag held by the child “no less than
a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of
subjective expectations of privacy.”37 In short, the Court recognized that
children are entitled to some amount of privacy, and the Fourth Amendment
protects them from unreasonable searches.
Second, the Court held that school officials searching students at school
may do so without a warrant and need only reasonable suspicion, not
probable cause.38 Crucially, the rationale for this holding rested on the
unique needs of school discipline and the relationships between educators
and pupils. The Court began its discussion by recognizing both the need for
“a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures” and “the
value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.”39
The Court couched its specific holdings in reference to both of these
elements. The Court excused school officials from seeking warrants before
searching students because that “would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools.”40 The need of teachers and administrators to maintain order
justified a standard less than probable cause—there must be “reasonable
grounds” that the search will reveal evidence of violating the law or a school
rule, and the scope of the search must be “reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive.”41 This lower standard provided
a particular benefit to teachers and other school staff—they would be
“spare[d] . . . the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of
probable cause.”42 This standard built on earlier cases, especially Terry v.
35. Id. at 338.
36. Id. at 339.
37. Id. at 337–38.
38. See id. at 367 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While neither
“probable cause” nor “reasonable suspicion” are easily defined standards, the former imposes
more limits on government authority and more protection for individual liberty and privacy.
As the Court noted in a later school-search case,
Perhaps the best that can be said generally about the required knowledge component
of probable cause for a law enforcement officer’s evidence search is that it raise[s]
a “fair probability” or a “substantial chance” of discovering evidence of criminal
activity. The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a
moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 237, 243 n.13 (1983)).
39. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 342.
42. Id. at 343.
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Ohio,43 which established an exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements for police officers to take “minimally necessary” action for a
“protective seizure and search for weapons.”44 T.L.O. cited Terry for its twopronged test and to describe what reasonable suspicion is necessary to justify
a search by school officials.45
Importantly, T.L.O. authorized a much broader range of warrantless
searches than Terry. Terry approved limited searches for weapons deemed
“necessary for the protection of [police officers] and others.”46 T.L.O., in
contrast, authorized school officials to conduct warrantless searches
whenever they reasonably suspect any legal or school rule violation.47
T.L.O.’s concurring opinions—which, given the Court’s vote breakdown,
are particularly important48—distinguish searches by school officials from
searches by police even more explicitly and perhaps offer guidance for some
principled limitations on searches authorized by T.L.O. Justice Lewis
Powell, Jr. wrote that teachers’ and students’ “close association with each
other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods” reduces
children’s expectation of privacy regarding those teachers.49 Justice Powell
explicitly contrasted this “special relationship” with “[l]aw enforcement
officers[, who] function as adversaries of criminal suspects,”50 and he further
contrasted “establishing discipline and maintaining order” in schools with
“the enforcement of criminal laws.”51
Justice Blackmun also concurred, describing a test used by the Court to
analyze a variety of searches conducted by individuals other than police or
for reasons other than criminal law enforcement.52 Such searches, he wrote,
could escape the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause
requirements “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable.”53 School searches by school
officials presented such special needs. School discipline is very important
and often requires “an immediate response,”54 and teachers should focus “on
43. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
44. Id. at 29–30.
45. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42, 345–46.
46. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (describing Terry as only
permitting “steps to assure [an officer] that the person he has stopped to question is not armed
with a weapon that could be used against him”).
47. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(describing the search in T.L.O. as more intrusive than the pat-down in Terry and observing
that, “[w]isely, neither petitioner nor the Court today attempts to justify the search of T.L.O.’s
pocketbook as a minimally intrusive search in the Terry line”).
48. Six justices supported the result in T.L.O., but Justice Lewis Powell, Jr.—joined by
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—and Justice Harry Blackmun wrote concurring opinions. Id.
at 326–27.
49. Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 349.
51. Id. at 350.
52. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 352–53.
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teaching and helping students,” not “developing evidence” against students
or considering “the complexities of probable cause” in particular situations.55
Blackmun’s “special needs” test became the basis for later Supreme Court
cases that determined when state actors were exempted from warrant and
probable cause requirements before conducting a search, and these later cases
underscored its distinction between “special needs” and “the normal need for
law enforcement.”56
Given the centrality of the discussion of school officials’ roles and
relationships with students in the plurality and concurring opinions, and the
explicit and implicit contrasts between school officials and police officers, it
is no surprise that the Court declined to address police searches in school or
searches conducted “in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement
agencies.”57 After deciding several more cases involving searches “divorced
from the State’s general interest in law enforcement,”58 the Court, in 2001,
emphasized this limit on T.L.O.’s holding.59
Indeed, there is little reason to think that the T.L.O. Court, writing years
before SROs become prominent fixtures in public schools nationally and the
development of policies intertwining school discipline and law enforcement,
anticipated the Fourth Amendment questions raised by later SRO searches.
T.L.O. assumed that any such overlap “is sufficiently rare to warrant treating
the two institutions distinctly.”60 Once those developments arose, however,
T.L.O.’s rationale set up an important question: Are searches by school
resource officers, or searches by school officials at the behest of or in
conjunction with SROs, governed by T.L.O.? Are SROs more like other
police officers, and thus subject to normal Fourth Amendment rules, or are
they more like school officials, whose special relationship with children
justifies a lower standard?
B. Standards for SRO-Involved Searches Remain Unresolved by the
Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has examined school searches on several occasions
since deciding T.L.O., but none of those cases has considered what standard
should govern searches involving SROs. This point is essential because, as
T.L.O. made clear, determining Fourth Amendment standards is contextual,61
and its analysis of the context shows that law enforcement searches should
be treated differently.62 Its holding depends not on a generalized reduction
of students’ Fourth Amendment rights at school, but on the particular context
of searches by school officials in furtherance of maintaining school discipline
55. Id. at 353.
56. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001) (quoting T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
57. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7.
58. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79.
59. Id. at 79 n.15.
60. Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 880 (2012).
61. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
62. See supra notes 26–60 and accompanying text.
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and the educational environment. No more recent Court case leads to a
different result.
This point bears emphasis because some have argued, I believe incorrectly,
that the Court’s later school-search cases hold that children at school are a
“special subpopulation” with reduced expectations of privacy justifying
lower standards for searches.63 The most important cases in this regard are
the Court’s two cases involving schools testing wide groups of students for
drug use: Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton64 and Board of Education
v. Earls.65 Both cases involve fairly similar facts. School districts required
students who participated in certain voluntary activities—sports in Acton66
and any extracurricular activity in Earls67—to consent to urinalysis drug
tests. Positive tests would require students to participate in a program
intended to help children stop using drugs. Failure to participate in such
programs or failure to consent to drug tests would bar participation in
voluntary activities but carry no law enforcement consequences.68
Despite dicta that, when taken out of context, could suggest a more
generalized reduction in schoolchildren’s Fourth Amendment rights,69 a
closer and more contextual reading of the Court’s cases reveals a more
nuanced rule. In particular, children’s expectation of privacy at school
depends on the context of a search70 and, especially, whether the search
involves law enforcement actors, purposes, or consequences. The Court
recognized that evaluating an individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy
“of course” requires a contextual analysis.71 And the Court’s contextual
analysis made clear that it discussed searches involving only school
officials,72 with consequences limited to voluntary school activities, not law
enforcement. Children’s supervision by a “schoolmaster” with “custodial
and tutelary” duties comes with a degree of supervision and control that

63. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 254, 270–71 (2011).
64. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
65. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
66. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 648.
67. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 826 (noting that the policy applied to “any extracurricular
activity” but “has been applied only to competitive extracurricular activities . . . such as
Academic Team, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, choir,
pom pon, cheerleading, and athletics”).
68. Id. at 833–34; see also Acton, 515 U.S. at 650–51.
69. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (“A student’s privacy interest is limited in a public school
environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.”);
Acton, 515 U.S. at 655–56 (“[W]hile children assuredly do not ‘shed their constitutional
rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,’ the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children
in school.” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
70. Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home: When Parental
Authority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 68–69 (2011).
71. Acton, 515 U.S. at 654.
72. T.L.O. refers to “teachers and administrators.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
341 (1985). I use the broader phrase “school officials” to encompass other staff such as
athletic coaches or nurses whose job duties could entail assisting with the school environment
but would not include law enforcement.
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reduces children’s privacy expectations vis-à-vis those schoolmasters.73
This language echoes T.L.O.’s emphasis on the special relationship between
teachers and students and offers no reason to suggest that this special
relationship extends beyond educators, and especially not to law
enforcement.
If anything, Acton and Earls emphasized the distinction between school
discipline and law enforcement even more than T.L.O. The Court noted that
a “rather critical consideration”74 in both cases was that consequences of the
drug tests were relatively minor and, in particular, that law enforcement
would not obtain the results so no delinquency or criminal charges would
result.75
More recent Supreme Court cases continue to leave the question of SROinvolved school searches unaddressed. Safford Unified School District #1 v.
Redding76 held that the strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl suspected of
possessing prescription-strength ibuprofen violated her Fourth Amendment
rights, even if the individuals who conducted the search were entitled to
qualified immunity.77 The Court’s summary of the facts does not indicate
any law enforcement involvement or plans to involve law enforcement and,
given that school officials found no evidence of any wrongdoing, there was
nothing to turn over to law enforcement.78 The Court’s language carefully
noted that T.L.O. applied to “searches by school officials,”79 before moving
on to the focus of that case.80
The absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling in any subsequent
school-search case81 has largely left resolution of the question to state courts,
which handle nearly all delinquency and criminal prosecutions of children
based on searches at school.
C. The Majority Rule: State Courts View SROs Like School Officials
Without a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, state courts have
decided in the first instance what Fourth Amendment standards to apply to
SRO searches of students at school. While many states’ courts have not yet

73. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 655).
74. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 10.11(c), at 631 n.139 (5th ed. 2012).
75. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 833–34; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658; see also Nance, supra note 3
(manuscript at 52) (noting courts’ emphasis of the limited invasion of privacy in the searches
at issue).
76. 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
77. Id. at 368.
78. Id. at 368–70, 372–73.
79. Id. at 370 (“We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the
legality of a school administrator’s search of a student . . . .”).
80. Safford focused not on who conducted the search or the level of suspicion required,
but on whether the scope of the search reasonably related to its basis; it did not. Id. at 373–77.
81. In addition to Acton, Earls, and Safford, the Court has also considered school seizures
in a child-protection context. See generally Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011). But the
Court dismissed that case as moot. Id. at 698.
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addressed the issue, the majority of state courts to do so have held that SROs
could take advantage of T.L.O.’s reduced Fourth Amendment limitations.82
Notably, the collective legal theory of these cases explicitly likens SROs
to school officials and describe SROs’ tasks as including school discipline,
assisting school staff, and even teaching classes. These cases view any law
enforcement purposes as either absent or subordinate to school disciplinary
purposes. This legal theory views SROs as unlike other police officers and
views them instead as at most “quasi-law enforcement.”83 Courts ask
whether SROs operate more like school officials who fall under T.L.O. or
other police officers who do not,84 and the majority of courts have answered
with the former.
1. Cases Explicitly Treating SROs as School Officials
The leading case for the majority view is People v. Dilworth,85 a 1996
Illinois Supreme Court case involving an SRO’s search of a student, Kenneth
Dilworth, who an SRO suspected was selling drugs on school grounds.86
Upon finding drugs on Dilworth, the SRO arrested him and the State
prosecuted him as an adult in criminal court.87 Dilworth argued that the SRO
needed probable cause because he was a police officer.88 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the SRO was
“properly considered to be a school official.”89 The court noted that the SRO
was involved in both criminal and school disciplinary incidents, and it
emphasized that blended role at least three times90 and explained that, like

82. Courts have acknowledged that this is the majority rule. See, e.g., R.D.S. v. State, 245
S.W.3d 356, 367 (Tenn. 2008); see also EMILY MORGAN ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS,
THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CONSENSUS REPORT: STRATEGIES FROM THE FIELD TO KEEP STUDENTS
ENGAGED IN SCHOOL AND OUT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 247 (2014); Developments in
the Law—Policing Students, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1748 (2015) (concluding that “most
courts hold that reasonable suspicion that a student is violating a law or school rule is
constitutionally sufficient” for a search involving SROs).
83. Kirk A. Bailey, Legal Knowledge Related to School Violence and School Safety, in
HANDBOOK OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND SCHOOL SAFETY: FROM RESEARCH TO PRACTICE 31, 38
(Shane R. Jimerson & Michael J. Furlong eds., 2006).
84. Id.; see also MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 247 (“Whether a municipal or county
SRO or school police officer is considered a ‘school official’ is also a critical determination
when it comes to the search standards to which officers are subject.”).
85. 661 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1996). A Westlaw KeyCite search conducted on January 26,
2019, showed that Dilworth has been cited in at least sixty-five cases, including twenty-three
outside of Illinois. It is also reported in law school casebooks as a leading case for its
conclusion. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATION 244 (5th ed. 2018); LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE
LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 444
(3d ed. 2012).
86. See Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 312–13 (summarizing facts); id. at 317 (concluding that
the SRO was “conducting a search on his own initiative and authority”).
87. Id. at 314.
88. Id. at 316.
89. Id. at 320.
90. Id. at 313, 317, 320.
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teachers, the officer “was authorized to give a detention.”91 As one
commentator noted, this was “an SRO empowered to discipline students
under the school’s rules.”92 Given this authority, the court concluded that
the SRO’s search primarily furthered not law enforcement aims (despite the
arrest and prosecution that immediately followed) but “the school’s attempt
to maintain a proper educational environment.”93
Dilworth’s view of the SRO as a school official—now reflecting the
majority view94—echoes through cases holding that SROs can use T.L.O.’s
lower Fourth Amendment standard.95 Multiple other state appellate courts
cite Dilworth and apply T.L.O. to searches by SROs.96 These cases either
cite and apply Dilworth without adding new analysis or assert a similar
reason that SROs count as school officials for Fourth Amendment purposes.
For instance, a Pennsylvania court wrote that SROs’ “presence in school
buildings during the school day ensures the safety and security of the learning
environment” to justify the court’s application of the reasonable suspicion
standard rather than probable cause standard to SROs.97
Other cases reach the same result. A Florida appellate court held that
SROs “should be treated as part of the school administrative team and not as
outside police officers.”98 An Indiana appellate court held that a police
officer acting as a school security officer on school premises could use the
T.L.O. standard,99 and the Indiana Supreme Court later offered some support
for this result for SROs who “perform[] school-discipline duties” (though it
91. Id. at 313.
92. See Developments in the Law—Policing Students, supra note 82, at 1751.
93. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 317.
94. Whether this rule was the majority rule at the time of Dilworth is subject to debate.
Compare id. at 319–20 (citing cases in other jurisdictions that apply a reasonableness test to
school police officer searches), with id. at 323 (Nickles, J., dissenting) (“All Federal and State
decisions reviewed indicate that police officers, including police liaison officers, are required
to have probable cause to search a student if they are significantly involved in the search.”).
95. See, e.g., In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287, 1300 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (applying
T.L.O. to a school security guard identified as an “officer” who placed the child under arrest
and who the court distinguished from “an investigative police officer”); Russell v. State, 74
S.W.3d 887, 892 (Tex. App. 2002) (“We believe the Dilworth analysis properly
applies . . . .”).
96. See, e.g., In re William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695, 699–701 (Ct. App. 2003); State v.
D.S., 685 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“We specifically hold that a search
conducted by a school police officer only requires reasonable suspicion . . . as distinguished
from the probable cause that is usually required to support a search conducted, away from the
school property, by an outside police officer . . . .”); In re Ana E., No. D-10378/01, 2002 WL
264325, at *9–11 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Jan. 14, 2002) (citing Dilworth and holding that SROs
supervised by the New York Police Department only needed reasonable suspicion to search
students); Commonwealth v. J.B., 719 A.2d 1058, 1065 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“A reasonable
suspicion standard applies when school officials, including teachers, teachers’ aides, school
administrators, school police officers and local police school liaison officers, conduct a search
acting on their own authority.” (emphasis omitted)).
97. J.B., 719 A.2d at 1066; see also William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 700 (asserting that there
is no distinction between school-employed security and city-employed police stationed at
schools and expressing concern about establishing incentives for schools to use the former
rather than the latter).
98. M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d 563, 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
99. S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
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did leave open the possibility that SROs who perform law enforcement duties
might not benefit from the same result).100 Other cases apply T.L.O. to SROinvolved searches without analysis or explanation.101
The view of SROs as school officials also appears in an Indiana statute,
which seems to be an effort to apply that lower standard in all cases in the
face of more nuanced court decisions. After the Indiana Supreme Court
suggested that SRO searches under T.L.O. depended on SROs pursuing
school-discipline rather than law enforcement duties,102 the Indiana
legislature enacted a statute permitting an SRO to use the reasonable
suspicion standard for searches and seizures without limitation.103 The
Indiana statute somewhat ironically also asserts law enforcement powers—
clarifying that SROs may make arrests, carry firearms, and “exercise other
police powers”—all while taking advantage of T.L.O.’s special needs
standard designed for educators.104
Such statutes represent a codification of the majority rule and thus help
illustrate the scope of that rule’s application. These statutes cannot, however,
force a particular constitutional result for those subject to them. As the
leading Fourth Amendment hornbook concludes, it “is quite clearly not the
case” that the state may conduct a particular type of search by providing
advance notice that it can.105
2. Cases Making It Easy to Establish SRO Involvement
as Serving a School Purpose
Several courts reached similar results through less direct means. Rather
than state explicitly that they would treat SROs as school officials, they
examined the facts of specific searches to reach case-specific determinations
that an SRO acted more like a school official than an officer. This approach
leaves open the possibility of applying the warrant and probable cause
requirements in later SRO-involved search cases, but the analyses suggest
such possibility is slim.
These cases went to some length to find that SROs acted more like school
officials and less like law enforcement.106 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
100. K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ind. 2013); see also T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d
362, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that the SRO “act[ed] to further educationally
related goals” and was entitled to T.L.O.’s standard).
101. See, e.g., State v. Voss, 267 P.3d 735, 736, 738–39 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011) (noting SRO
involvement and applying T.L.O. without discussion); State v. Taylor, 38 So. 3d 360 (La.
2010); State v. Taylor, 50 So. 3d 922, 923 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that an SRO searched
a student); In re Steven A., 764 N.Y.S.2d 99, 99–100 (App. Div. 2003) (applying T.L.O. to a
police department employee without explanation).
102. K.W., 984 N.E.2d at 613.
103. IND. CODE § 20-26-18.2-3(a)(2) (2017).
104. Id. § 20-26-18.2-3(a)(4).
105. See 5 LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 10.11(b), at 620.
106. See, e.g., State v. Alaniz, 815 N.W.2d 234, 239 (N.D. 2012) (applying T.L.O. to an
SRO “who was working with other school officials to investigate violations of school rules
and the law” even though the SRO used information gleaned from an out-of-school
investigation to inform the principal of his suspicions regarding the child).
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held that T.L.O. applies when SROs search students “at the request of, and in
conjunction with, school authorities”; therefore, the school officials’ request
effectively extended the school officials’ Fourth Amendment standards to
law enforcement.107 That logic would seem to apply even if the school
requested the SRO to search a student precisely because the student was
suspected of committing a crime that the school believed required a law
enforcement response. Applying the Wisconsin case, a North Carolina
appellate court concluded that SROs could use the T.L.O. standard when they
searched a child in conjunction with the school principal—even when three
armed and uniformed officers accompanied a single school official and when
the school official consulted the officers about whether to search students.108
A later North Carolina case extended that rule to cover a situation in which
an SRO, on his own, suspected a child possessed marijuana and initiated a
search; the court held that because the SRO “assisted school officials with
school discipline” and “was furthering the school’s educational related goals
when he stopped the juvenile,” T.L.O.’s standard would apply.109 Similarly,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals described “a full-time, commissioned
police officer assigned to a public high school as a resource officer”110 who
worked both to enforce the criminal law and help maintain a positive
educational environment.111 When a school official asked the SRO to search
a student who the school official suspected of possessing drugs and an
unknown object that presented a “safety issue,” the court concluded that “the
officer was the arm of the school official” and was thus entitled to use the
T.L.O. standard.112 In rejecting a child’s federal civil rights challenge to a
search, the Eighth Circuit, like the state court in Dilworth, emphasized facts
regarding an SRO’s role that made his purpose closer to school discipline,
especially that the SRO was “instructed to cooperate with the school
officials.”113 Accordingly, when school officials asked the SRO for
assistance searching a child, the court concluded that the SRO’s involvement

107. See In re Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Wis. 1997); see also In re Sumpter,
No. 2004-CA-00161, 2004 WL 2806428, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2004) (applying
T.L.O. when an assistant principal requested that an SRO search a student because the search
was initiated by school staff, not the SRO); F.S.E. v. State, 993 P.2d 771, 773 (Okla. 1999)
(“[A] school official may utilize law enforcement to assist with an investigation or search of
a student . . . so long as the public school official has a reasonable suspicion . . . .”).
108. See In re D.D., 554 S.E.2d 346, 348, 352–54 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
109. In re S.W., 614 S.E.2d 424, 425, 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
110. In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431, 433 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the SRO “searched
a student at the behest of a school official”). This language suggests that a different rule might
apply if the SRO acted on his own authority.
111. Id. at 437.
112. Id.; see also In re J.D., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464, 471 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that T.L.O.
applied to a search initiated by “campus security officers” who were “acting at the behest of
Richmond High School administrators”). More limited involvement in one case—when a
school administrator searched a student while SROs happened to be in the same room—led to
the same result. State v. Burdette, 225 P.3d 736, 738 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010).
113. Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 190 (8th Cir. 1987).
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did not change the character of the search from school discipline to law
enforcement.114
Although these cases do not state an absolute rule that SRO-involved
searches always qualify for T.L.O.’s standard, their analysis and dicta suggest
that they usually will. These cases describe SROs as part of the school’s
team, explicitly authorized and encouraged to engage in ordinary school
discipline, and as predominantly serving schools’ special needs and only
rarely serving law enforcement goals. After reciting various security
concerns present in schools, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said it “may
reasonably infer” that an SRO stationed full-time at a school has a core
mission of “assist[ing] school officials in maintaining a safe and proper
educational environment,” a goal which triggered the T.L.O. standard.115
The North Carolina Court of Appeals similarly “infer[red]” that SROs served
goals related to the educational environment even without stating evidence
supporting such an inference.116 Both cases involved students suspected of
possessing illegal contraband who, in fact, were detained and charged once
contraband was found on them.117 Yet neither addressed when, if ever, an
SRO search could have primarily law enforcement goals. One unpublished
case illustrates the narrow circumstances in which this analysis would lead a
court to not apply T.L.O.—when school officials had already “completed
[their] investigation” of the student and imposed discipline, which made it
impossible to construe a subsequent search by the SRO as anything other
than law enforcement.118 A slight change of facts would make that case look
like other SRO-involved searches deemed to fall under T.L.O.
Notably, these cases do not address the criminal or juvenile justice
consequences of particular searches. These searches, presumably conducted
for school disciplinary purposes, led to some kind of law enforcement
consequences, usually arrests and charges, and often for relatively minimal
behavior—such as the child who borrowed a knife from another student on a
school bus and was charged with possessing a dangerous weapon on school
property.119 Because the courts viewed these cases as involving school
searches, they left those consequences unaddressed.
114. Id. at 191–92. The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed this approach in Shade v. City of
Farmington, in which it rejected a challenge to a search by SROs “[b]ecause school officials
initiated the investigation and search . . . in furtherance of the school’s interest in maintaining
a safe learning environment, and because they asked officers to assist them in furtherance of
that interest . . . .” 309 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2002).
115. In re Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Wis. 1997).
116. In re D.D., 554 S.E.2d 346, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
117. Id. at 350; Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d at 684.
118. In re Welfare of T.D.B., No. 13-JV-15-142, 2018 WL 492641, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 22, 2018). Perhaps notably, this is a more recent case, decided in 2018, after the reforms
discussed in Part III.
119. Shade, 309 F.3d at 1058; see also, e.g., Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 190 (8th Cir.
1987) (describing how an SRO gave child suspects “juvenile appearance cards” to report to
the police station); State v. Burdette, 225 P.3d 736, 738 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (charging the
child with possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia); R.D.S. v. State, 245
S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tenn. 2008) (charging the child with simple possession or casual exchange
of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia).
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The lack of analysis of the consequences of searches is consistent with the
broad approval of T.L.O.’s application to searches conducted by school
officials regardless of what those officials do with the fruits of the search.
Dilworth’s analysis began by noting that school officials benefit from
T.L.O.’s reduced Fourth Amendment standard.120 One illustrative trial court
explained, “The Court finds the school has an absolute right to conduct
searches for protection of students and there’s no showing here that any of
this search was as a result of officer action.”121 One element that might
distinguish such searches from T.L.O. is that school districts now have
policies and agreements with law enforcement requiring school officials to
turn over evidence of crimes discovered in school searches.122 By focusing
on whether the search itself “was a result of officer action,” courts avoid
analyzing whether those policies and agreements affect T.L.O.’s
applicability. That issue is explored in Part I.D.2, which describes critiques
of the majority rule.
3. Cases Do Not Generally Hold That Children Are
Always Entitled to Less Privacy
An important corollary to state courts’ arguments that SROs are school
officials for Fourth Amendment purposes is that children at school are not
susceptible to searches and seizures based on the reasonable suspicion
standard in all circumstances—only when searched by someone who
qualifies as a school official. If children’s expectation of privacy at school
was reduced in all circumstances, these cases would have been much easier
for courts to decide—they would not have to analyze SROs’ roles and
articulate how they qualify as school officials.
That said, Dilworth implies that children do have reduced expectations of
privacy. Dilworth applied Acton’s balancing test, and quoted it as providing
that “students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of
privacy than members of the population generally.”123 That citation cannot
fairly be read as supporting a holding that children always have a reduced
expectation of privacy at school.124 At least one state court has held

120. People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996); see also State v. Scott, 630 S.E.2d
563, 565 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing “a bright line between searches conducted solely
by school officials and those involving a law enforcement officer” and holding that the former
are “subject only to the most minimal restraints necessary to insure that students are not
whimsically stripped of personal privacy and subjected to petty tyranny” (quoting State v.
Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, 593 (Ga. 1975))).
121. A.W. v. State, 510 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting the trial court).
122. See infra Part IV.B.
123. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 318 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657
(1995)).
124. See Barry C. Feld, T.L.O and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth
Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 888–89 (2011)
(criticizing Dilworth’s use of the Acton factors); Henning, supra note 70, at 68–69 (describing
the proper analysis as context-specific).
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similarly, also citing Acton, though this case is an outlier compared to those
discussed in Parts I.C.1 and I.C.2.125
Any suggestion or holding that children have lesser expectations of
privacy in reference to any search at school is hard to square with the cases
those courts rely upon. Crucially, the Acton language came in the context of
a search by school officials with no law enforcement consequences, as
discussed in Part I.B above. And the cited Acton language includes a quote
from Justice Powell’s T.L.O. concurrence which, as discussed in Part I.A
above, explicitly contrasted school officials’ searches from law enforcement
searches.126
Moreover, both Dilworth, individually, and the weight of state court
opinions, more generally, make clear that students sometimes do have a
significant expectation of privacy at school. Dilworth indicates that when
“outside police officers” conduct or initiate a search, probable cause is
required127—a holding which reaffirms that who does the search and,
perhaps, the reasonably expected consequences of that search, matter to the
Fourth Amendment standard. If children always had a reduced expectation
of privacy at school, then the identity of the person searching them would not
matter. Yet courts almost universally have held that searches by outside
police officers at school do not trigger T.L.O.’s standard.128
That distinction regarding outside police officers suggests two essential
points. First, it underscores how these cases, rightly or wrongly, treat SROs
differently than other police officers and the importance of how the law
characterizes SROs’ roles. Second, it shows that the purpose of a search and
the identity of the searcher provide the decisive context for determining the
proper Fourth Amendment standard.129 Instead of holding that children
always lack a reasonable expectation of privacy, Dilworth and cases holding
similarly rely on the identification of SROs as acting more like school
officials tasked with primarily protecting a school’s learning environment
than law enforcement officers. Dilworth and its progeny reflect not a
rewriting of T.L.O.’s holding about students’ reasonable expectation of
privacy writ large, but an SRO-specific conclusion that classified SROs as
school officials and made that classification define the boundary between
special needs searches under T.L.O. and normal law enforcement searches.

125. See Lindsey ex rel. Lindsey v. Caddo Par. Sch. Bd., 954 So. 2d 272, 274 (La. Ct. App.
2007).
126. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
127. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 317.
128. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Villagran, 81 N.E.3d 310, 314 (Mass. 2017) (declining to
apply T.L.O. to a search by a non-SRO police officer); State v. Tywayne H., 933 P.2d 251,
253–56 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (same); In re Thomas B.D., 486 S.E.2d 498, 500 (S.C. Ct. App.
1997) (same); see also 5 LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 10.11(b), at 627 (“This is certainly the
correct conclusion when an officer whose duties normally are performed elsewhere comes to
the school and initiates a search there or gets school officials to so act on his behalf.”).
129. In re D.D., 54 S.E.2d 346, 352–53 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
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D. Longstanding Criticisms of the Majority Rule
Dilworth’s majority rule is not without dissenters, both among courts and
commentators.
1. Minority Jurisdictions
While Dilworth and other cases discussed in Part I.C represent the majority
rule, that rule is not universally accepted. Dilworth’s dissenting opinion
argued that SROs are more accurately considered law enforcement officers
for Fourth Amendment purposes.130 More importantly, several state courts
have adopted the dissent’s view, concluding that SROs qualify as law
enforcement officers and distinguishing them from school officials. In 2012,
the Washington Supreme Court refused to apply T.L.O. to a search by an
SRO because his law enforcement role created “a fundamental difference”
with a search by school officials.131 The facts of the SRO’s role mattered.
While the SRO in Dilworth had authority to impose school disciplinary
consequences on students,132 the Washington SRO “ha[d] no authority to
discipline students.”133 The New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to apply
T.L.O. to an SRO whose “job essentially was to investigate criminal activity
on school grounds,” and who had an agreement with the school principal that
the school would handle discipline and the SRO would handle criminal law
enforcement.134 A Georgia appellate court ruled that SROs cannot use T.L.O.
but did not offer much of an explanation for that conclusion.135 And Iowa
has codified a rule preventing peace officers from using T.L.O.’s relaxed
standard.136
Tennessee has placed itself in a middle ground that emphasizes the
importance of closely analyzing SROs’ role. The Tennessee Supreme Court
held that the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard for a search conducted
by an SRO at school depends on whether the SRO’s “duties more closely
align with the duties of a school official.”137 Applying that lower standard
requires finding that the SRO’s duties are “beyond those of a[n] ordinary law
130. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 321 (Nickels, J., dissenting); see also M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d
563, 568–71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Hawkes, J., dissenting) (arguing that SROs are not
school officials and thus may not rely on T.L.O.).
131. State v. Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 86 (Wash. 2012) (en banc).
132. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
133. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 87.
134. State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634, 636 (N.H. 2001). The facts of Heirtzler were more
complicated, involving a referral of suspicious activity from a teacher to the SRO to school
administrators, who conducted the search and then turned its fruits over to the officer. Id. at
637. These facts are discussed in Part IV.B.
135. Patman v. State, 537 S.E.2d 118, 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). Additionally, a Florida
appellate court also ruled that an SRO cannot use T.L.O. A.J.M. v. State, 617 So. 2d 1137,
1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). However, a more recent Florida case came to the opposite
conclusion. M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d 563, 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
136. IOWA CODE § 808A.3 (2015). The Iowa code limits T.L.O. to school officials, and it
defines such officials to include “unlicensed school employees employed for security or
supervision purposes” but not officers. Id. § 808A.1(3).
137. R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 370 (Tenn. 2008).
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enforcement officer such that he or she may be considered a school official
as well as a law enforcement officer.”138 The court remained neutral on
whether this test was met and remanded for further proceedings.139 The
unpublished decision on remand concludes that the SRO was a law
enforcement officer and therefore needed probable cause,140 but no
precedential opinion decides the issue beyond that case.
In addition to state courts adopting the minority rule for Fourth
Amendment purposes, several other courts have adopted a rule, in different
contexts, which treats SROs as law enforcement officers. Those cases
address interrogations of students at school and determine what
circumstances amount to custody for Miranda purposes.141 An interrogation
by school officials alone does not generally amount to a custodial
interrogation, which would require authorities to provide the Miranda
warnings.142 Despite the majority rule for Fourth Amendment purposes,
however, several courts and other state authorities have treated SROs as law
enforcement officers when determining if a school interrogation is custodial
for Miranda purposes.143
2. Critiques of the Majority Rule
Academics have long criticized courts for applying a Fourth Amendment
test designed for school disciplinary purposes to SRO-involved searches in

138. Id. at 369.
139. Id. at 370.
140. State v. R.D.S., No. M2008-01724-COA-R3-JV, 2009 WL 2136324, at *9 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 16, 2009). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 356–59 and
accompanying text.
141. Miranda requires authorities to inform suspects of their rights to silence and an
attorney before authorities begin a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966).
142. See, e.g., Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995 (D. Me. 1982); Paul Holland, Schooling
Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV.
39, 40–41 (2006). But see RANDY HERTZ, ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 614 (2015), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
Hertz-Trial-Manual-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZFV5-EYMU] (noting that requiring a
student to report to the principal’s office should be considered a custodial interrogation).
143. See, e.g., B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225 (Ind. 2018); N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396
S.W.3d 852, 855 (Ky. 2013); In re R.J.E., 630 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d on
other grounds, 642 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 2002); State v. Antonio T., 352 P.3d 1172, 1180 (N.M.
2015); In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 2002); Ariz. Office of the Att’y Gen., No. I04-003,
Opinion on Law Enforcement Interviews of Students at Public Schools, at 2 n.1 (2004). Some
of these cases possibly create tension with Fourth Amendment law in a particular state. For
instance, the Indiana Supreme Court held in B.A. that a student interrogated by a vice principal
and SRO was in custody for Miranda purposes. B.A., 100 N.E.3d at 233. But an Indiana
statute, building on earlier state court precedent, provides that SROs may use the reasonable
suspicion standard. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
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school144 and even to searches only indirectly involving law enforcement.145
Michael Pinard wrote that “the increased interdependency between law
enforcement authorities and public school officials, as well as the increased
use of the criminal justice system to monitor and punish behavior” require
stronger Fourth Amendment protections than those provided by T.L.O. and
cases like Dilworth.146 Barry Feld echoed these concerns, arguing that
“[e]quating the search standard of school officials with SROs conflates the
two despite the substantial difference in roles, disregards the greatly
expanded police presence in school, and ignores the increased referrals of
youths to juvenile courts from cases originating in schools.”147
These arguments emphasize that SROs are law enforcement officers,
regardless of any school disciplinary tasks in which they might engage.
Federal law defining SROs (as part of a federal grant program) makes clear
that SROs are “career law enforcement officer[s]” who should have “sworn
authority.”148 SROs’ tasks are “to address crime and disorder problems,”
including gangs and drugs at school, and to engage in a range of crime
prevention and education efforts.149 Those other efforts might distinguish an
SRO’s job from other officers, but they do not make the job something other
than law enforcement; the federal statute describes these tasks as
“community-oriented policing.”150 SROs’ law enforcement authority is
evident in literally every case discussed in Part I.C—SROs in those cases
arrested, charged, or somehow imposed a non-school-related, law
enforcement consequence on students.
Critiquing cases which involve SROs and other law enforcement officials
only indirectly is more difficult. In such cases, school officials suspect
students possess evidence of a crime, search students for that evidence
without SRO involvement, and then, following school district policies or
agreements with law enforcement, turn over any such evidence they find to
While conducting searches without law enforcement
the SRO.151
superficially suggests that T.L.O. applies, the presence of policies requiring
disclosure to law enforcement and post-T.L.O. special needs and
administrative-search cases support a different view—such searches are so
entangled with law enforcement that T.L.O. should no longer apply.
144. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 124, at 888–89; Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s
“Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-Law Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. &
EDUC. 291, 296 n.13 (2004); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom:
Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law
Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003); Developments in the Law—
Policing Students, supra note 82, at 1758–59. T.L.O. itself has long been an unpopular opinion
among academics. See, e.g., JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 194 (2018) (collecting early
academic critiques of T.L.O.).
145. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 144, at 304–13.
146. See Pinard, supra note 144, at 1069–70.
147. See Feld, supra note 124, at 892.
148. See 34 U.S.C. § 10389(4) (2012).
149. See id. § 10389(4)(A).
150. Id. § 10389(4).
151. For examples of such cases, see supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
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The U.S. Supreme Court offered support for this conclusion via Ferguson
v. City of Charleston, in which it held that “extensive entanglement” with
law enforcement prevented authorities from categorizing a search by nurses
at a public hospital as a special needs search entitled to an exception from
warrant and probable cause requirements.152 Ferguson involved a joint effort
between the hospital, local police, local prosecutors, and substance abuse and
child protection agencies to identify women who used illegal drugs while
pregnant.153 Under protocols agreed upon by the hospital, police, and
prosecutors, hospital staff would test pregnant and postpartum women for
cocaine use and turn over positive tests to law enforcement.154 While the
local government defendants asserted that “special non-law-enforcement
purposes” satisfied T.L.O.’s special needs test,155 the Court concluded that
the searches at issue were too entangled with law enforcement purposes for
that test to apply.156
The Court’s reasoning analogizes to school searches. First, the Court
noted that the only special needs searches it had approved were “divorced
from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.”157 Consistent with that
language, Ferguson emphasized both that T.L.O. should not be read to
endorse school searches involving law enforcement158 and that the non-lawenforcement consequences in Acton provided essential context for the
searches at issue in that case.159
Second, Ferguson emphasized that to determine whether the special needs
test is met, the Court must perform a “close review” of the claimed special
need.160 The Court offered different formulations of what this review should
entail, but the bottom line is the same—“extensive entanglement of law
enforcement cannot be justified by reference to legitimate needs.”161 The
majority opinion sought to identify the “primary” and “programmatic
purpose” of the searches.162 The Court recognized that the “ultimate”
purpose of the searches involved “therapeutic” aims, but what mattered was
the “immediate objective . . . to generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes.”163 Concurring, Justice Anthony Kennedy critiqued the “ultimate
goals” versus “immediate purposes” distinction,164 but he concluded that

152. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 n.20 (2001).
153. Id. at 70–71.
154. Id. at 72.
155. Id. at 73.
156. Id. at 79–84.
157. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 79 n.15.
159. See id. at 77–78 (noting that Acton only approved the loss of the ability to participate
in an extracurricular activity).
160. Id. at 81 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997)).
161. Id. at 83 n.20.
162. Id. at 81.
163. Id. at 82–83, 83 n.20.
164. Id. at 86–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Five justices joined the majority opinion, and
Justice Kennedy concurred separately. Id. at 69 (majority opinion).
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“substantial law enforcement involvement” made the special needs test
inapplicable:
The special needs cases we have decided do not sustain the active use of
law enforcement, including arrest and prosecutions, as an integral part of a
program which seeks to achieve legitimate, civil objectives. The traditional
warrant and probable-cause requirements are waived in our previous cases
on the explicit assumption that the evidence obtained in the search is not
intended to be used for law enforcement purposes.165

Ferguson’s analysis underscores the importance of distinguishing law
enforcement and school discipline goals when considering school
searches.166 Just as school searches involving SROs may be intended to
serve broad goals of maintaining a positive school environment, the searches
in Ferguson sought to reduce drug abuse—but neither goal means the special
needs test applies. “[L]aw enforcement involvement always serves some
broader social purpose or objective,” so closer analysis is required.167 In
Ferguson, the Court could not distinguish legitimate special needs from the
law enforcement action. The Court reviewed official policies developed by
a public entity and law enforcement, and where law enforcement officers
“were extensively involved in the day-to-day administration of the
policy.”168 In contemporary school searches, a “non-law enforcement
special need for a search becomes indistinguishable from the law
enforcement purposes of the search.”169
Ferguson’s analysis also illustrates how a search’s consequences matter
for determining whether that search must satisfy normal Fourth Amendment
rules or instead qualifies as a special needs search. Ferguson noted that a
search that could disqualify an individual from an activity to which he had
no constitutional entitlement—such as an extracurricular high school
activity, as in Acton or Earls—involves a far more modest invasion of
privacy than a search leading to law enforcement consequences.170 Focusing
on such consequences both explains existing special needs case law and
normatively justifies when Fourth Amendment rights should be greater or
lesser.171 This focus on consequences evokes earlier cases that emphasized
that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements may
be waived when “nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved,”172 as well

165. Id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
166. See Pinard, supra note 144, at 1101 n.174 (analogizing school officials required to
report all criminal incidents to law enforcement to the hospital staff in Ferguson).
167. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
168. Id. at 82.
169. Developments in the Law—Policing Students, supra note 82, at 1760.
170. Id. at 1762.
171. Feld, supra note 124, at 918; Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta
v. Greene, Child Protection Investigations, and the Need to Reform the Fourth Amendment
Special Needs Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REV. 353, 406–21 (2012).
172. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971); see also Gupta-Kagan, supra note 171,
at 408–09.
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as scholarship endorsing “constitutional values” impacted by searches and
seizures.173
Giving a law enforcement officer with the power to arrest individuals the
fruits of a search—and thus increasing the likelihood of arrests and charges—
imposes law enforcement consequences on school searches and should affect
the Fourth Amendment analysis.174 At least one state appellate court has
recognized that the more severe consequences included in “punishment for
violating a criminal statute” as compared with violating school rules explains
why law enforcement officers require probable cause before they may search
someone.175 These consequences can, of course, flow even if law
enforcement officers are not the ones conducting a search, especially when
school policies or agreements require disclosure to law enforcement.
Catherine Kim has made analogous arguments—that consequences
involving the juvenile justice system cannot be said to serve children’s
interests and thus differ from how T.L.O. imagined school discipline.176
Given those consequences, practices that primarily serve law enforcement
goals should trigger “the full scope of constitutional protections that would
be available to youth outside of the school context,” meaning, at a minimum,
that T.L.O. would not apply.177
One state court has addressed these Ferguson-based arguments, but it
unconvincingly attempted to distinguish that case. In Commonwealth v.
Lawrence L.,178 a child sought to suppress marijuana found in a search by a
vice principal and turned over to law enforcement pursuant to an agreement
between the school district and the local police department and district
attorney’s office.179 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however,
held that this agreement did not render the school an “agent of the police”
and that T.L.O. still applied.180 The court’s focus on agency is misplaced, as
Ferguson focused on programmatic purposes and entanglement with law
enforcement.181 The Massachusetts court then asserted that the “ultimate
interests involved here differ substantially” from Ferguson, and, in
particular, that school officials have an interest in “maintaining a safe
learning environment and taking swift disciplinary action.”182 Yet the court
offered no explanation as to why this interest trumped the law enforcement
purposes codified in the agreement requiring disclosure of evidence by
173. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 805
(1994).
174. See Developments in the Law—Policing Students, supra note 82, at 1762 (“[T]he
identity of who uses the result of a search does bear on the seriousness of the privacy
intrusion.”).
175. R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Tenn. 2008).
176. See Kim, supra note 60, at 891–92.
177. Id. at 894.
178. 792 N.E.2d 109 (Mass. 2003).
179. Id. at 110–11.
180. Id. at 112–13. The court framed its agency focus as rooted in the defendant’s
argument. Id.
181. See supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text.
182. Lawrence L., 792 N.E.2d at 113.

2038

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

school officials, or how the interest in school discipline differed from the
public health interest in preventing the use of drugs during pregnancy and
inducing individuals with drug problems to obtain substance abuse treatment.
In the end, both Ferguson and school searches like that in Lawrence L.
involved law enforcement purposes codified in memoranda of understanding
with police departments and intertwined with legitimate special needs. In
addition, both led to law enforcement consequences that weigh against
applying a special needs exception to the warrant requirement.183 Neither
special need is adequately distinguished from law enforcement to justify
T.L.O.’s application.
II. THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE AND CALLS TO
REFORM THE ROLES OF SROS
That the bulk of cases discussed in Parts I.C and I.D were decided in the
1990s and 2000s is no coincidence—that is when SROs became a fixture of
American schools. The number of SROs grew substantially over the past
generation, leading some to describe “[s]chool-based policing” as “the fastest
growing area of law enforcement.”184 While SROs numbered less than 100
in the 1970s, their numbers grew dramatically alongside concerns about
crime at school and elsewhere in the 1980s and beyond: there were 12,300
SROs by 1997 and nearly 20,000 by 2007.185 A survey published in 2015
reported that 30 percent of public schools nationally had SROs,186 and a
majority of middle and high schools now have SROs.187 High-profile school
shootings have catalyzed a range of actions to provide more SROs in
schools.188
183. See supra notes 170–76 and accompanying text.
184. About NASRO, NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, https://nasro.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/4X5H-RV52] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see also TOM R. TYLER & RICK
TRINKNER, WHY CHILDREN FOLLOW RULES: LEGAL SOCIALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LEGITIMACY 54 (2017) (describing the “unprecedented surge of law enforcement presence
in schools”); Amanda Merkwae, Note, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability and the
Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 158 (2015).
185. SARAH E. REDFIELD & JASON P. NANCE, ABA JOINT TASK FORCE ON REVERSING THE
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 51 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/diversity_pipeline/stp_preliminary_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/722A-29AZ]; see also R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 367 (Tenn. 2008)
(“Since T.L.O. was decided, there has been an increasing presence of law enforcement officers
in public schools . . . .”). The number of SROs grew substantially between 1997 and 2008
following federal grants supporting the hiring and training of more than 6500 new SROs.
Barbara Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 570–71
(2016).
186. LUCINDA GRAY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY
AND DISCIPLINE: 2013–14, at 10 tbl.7 (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015051.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5DD-BR66].
187. Fedders, supra note 185, at 571; see also TYLER & TRINKNER, supra note 184, at 163
(discussing the increasing presence of law enforcement officers in schools).
188. See, e.g., MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 196 (summarizing federal and state steps
to increase SROs after the December 2012 massacre at an elementary school in Newtown,
Connecticut). Calls for increased numbers of SROs have followed more recent school
shootings. F. Chris Curran, A School Resource Officer in Every School?, WTOP (Apr. 11,
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As the numbers of school resource officers increased, so did several other
trends. First, SROs’ roles frequently expanded to include school discipline,
consistent with the analysis of cases following the majority rule. Second,
other policies which directed more children to the juvenile and criminal
justice systems for school-based incidents developed, and SROs’ roles
furthered that trend.189 That development became known as the school-toprison pipeline, and criticisms of SROs’ broad roles became a featured
element of research and advocacy to reform that pipeline. Those criticisms
informed later reform efforts, which are discussed in Part III.
A. SROs’ Roles
That thousands of SROs were first stationed at public schools in the 1990s
and 2000s is clear,190 but what precisely they did—and how much of their
activities could be categorized as law enforcement and how much as serving
an educational special need—was somewhat hard to define. SROs follow a
“triad” model, in which they engage in law enforcement, teach students
(often about the law), and mentor students.191 A 2005 study of a variety of
programs found that which corner of the triad received the most emphasis
“varie[d] considerably across and within programs.”192 Other studies found
similar variation.193
Most SROs engaged in a range of activities well beyond law enforcement,
and non-law-enforcement activity increased over time. These activities were
consistent with cases adopting the majority rule, which emphasized non-lawenforcement roles.194 Some written agreements between law enforcement
2018, 6:49 AM), https://wtop.com/education/2018/04/a-school-resource-officer-in-everyschool/ [https://perma.cc/ZC6M-MPRM]; Stephanie Saul et al., School Officer: A Job with
Many Roles and One Big Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/04/us/school-resource-officers-shooting.html
[https://perma.cc/ZTD4-HM6E];
Maayan Schechter & Jamie Self, Gov. McMaster Wants Police Officers in Every SC School.
One Big Obstacle—Money, STATE (Mar. 1, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://www.thestate.com/
news/local/article202910609.html [https://perma.cc/6TSC-FV3Y]; Carly Zervis, Sheriff,
School Board Agree: More SROs Needed. But How Many?, CITRUS COUNTY CHRON. (Mar.
16, 2018), http://www.chronicleonline.com/news/education/sheriff-school-board-agreemore-sros-needed-but-how-many/article_2a3c5488-292c-11e8-9a4e-d7c8c5e59103.html
[https://perma.cc/UR2T-5YW3]. These calls have led to some increases in the number of
schools with SROs. See, e.g., Press Release, S.C. Dep’t of Educ., 38 South Carolina School
Districts to Receive Funding for New School Resource Officers (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://ed.sc.gov/newsroom/news-releases/38-south-carolina-school-districts-to-receivefunding-for-new-school-resource-officers/ [https://perma.cc/27S4-2VU3]. Such efforts are
contested. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., POLICE IN SCHOOLS ARE NOT THE ANSWER
TO SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 3 (2018), https://dignityinschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
Police-In-Schools-2018-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKD2-PJP8].
189. See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for
Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313, 327–31 (2016) (describing various contributors to the pipeline).
190. See Fedders, supra note 185, at 567.
191. PETER FINN ET AL., COMPARISON OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND LESSONS LEARNED
AMONG 19 SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER (SRO) PROGRAMS 1 (2005).
192. Id.
193. Kim, supra note 60, at 882–83.
194. FINN ET AL., supra note 191, at 13; see also The Evolving Role of Police in Schools,
TEX. SCH. SAFETY CTR., https://txssc.txstate.edu/topics/law-enforcement/articles/evolving-
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agencies and school districts specified that SROs should “enforce the school
Some memoranda of
district’s student disciplinary process.”195
understanding (MOUs) called on SROs to avoid any school disciplinary
work, but many others lacked clear descriptions of SROs’ intended
activities.196 In practice, that led to SROs engaging in a range of activity
beyond traditional law enforcement. One report highlighted an SRO who
admitted “playing [school discipline] by ear” and eventually asserting a
greater role in writing school discipline reports on issues as minor as school
uniform violations.197 Surveys of law enforcement agencies with SRO
programs found that SROs spent, on average, half of their time on law
enforcement activities and the rest on other activities (though those surveys
did not define “law enforcement activities”).198
One report funded by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on SRO
activities implied that law enforcement activities would blend with school
discipline, and it described the effects of SROs “arresting, citing, or turning
in students to school administrators” and referred to the children receiving
this response not as delinquents but with broader language such as
“troublemakers.”199 The report went on to critically describe one school
principal’s efforts to limit SROs to a law enforcement role.200 The report
suggested that a model in which SROs became engaged in a wide set of
activities was both better and more common. In practice, this meant an
entirely novel shift in school discipline; as one scholar put it, “[T]he
introduction of law enforcement officers into schools has transformed
student misconduct into a matter to be dealt with by the criminal justice
system.”201
B. The School-to-Prison Pipeline and Reform Efforts
The growth in the number of SROs and the expansion of their roles into
school discipline did not occur in a vacuum. It began in the 1990s, at a time
when concern about juvenile crime—which peaked in 1994 and has steadily
declined since—led to a range of reforms that treated children more
punitively.202 At the same time, policies and practices developed which
furthered the “criminalization of school discipline.”203 State laws and school
district policies required that schools refer student misbehavior in schools to
role-of-police [https://perma.cc/6Z6Y-BX78] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (“[S]chool-based
law enforcement officers have expanded their range of duties since they were first assigned to
schools.”). This point does not endorse those cases and only observes that some of those
cases’ descriptive points were accurate.
195. FINN ET AL., supra note 191, at 31.
196. Id. at 24–26.
197. Id. at 30–31.
198. Id. at 14–15.
199. Id. at 19.
200. Id. at 19–20.
201. Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers: A Conceptual and
Methodological Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 591, 596 (2006).
202. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 189–90; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 185, at 51.
203. REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 185, at 50–51 (citing sources for the phrase).
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law enforcement.204 Broad criminal laws—such as those criminalizing any
behavior which amounted to “disturbing schools”—rendered a large swath
of adolescent misbehavior criminal.205 In combination with these policies,
SROs’ increased presence and involvement in school discipline led to a sharp
increase in arrests for incidents arising at school.206 Searches involving
SROs, in particular, “increase the likelihood of . . . being swept into the
juvenile justice system by being arrested, adjudicated, or detained.”207
Schools became a primary source of delinquency cases referred to juvenile
court. The proportion of all juvenile charges arising from incidents at school
was found to be 17 percent nationally and significantly higher in some
jurisdictions, which demonstrates a significant overlap between school
discipline and law enforcement.208 Reformers named policies leading to
these figures the “school-to-prison pipeline,” a phrase which began among
academics and advocates,209 but which entities like the American Bar
Association (ABA) and the DOJ have subsequently adopted.210
This increased rate of school-based arrests and charges led to a reform
movement that focused on SROs’ roles and sought to end the
“criminalization” of school discipline.211 The same feature described by
proponents as a feature of SROs’ presence at school—their involvement in
school discipline—was, in the eyes of reformers, reason to worry that such
involvement led to an increasing number of arrests for minor misbehavior.212
A variety of studies concluded that children receiving law enforcement
responses were dramatically harmed, especially when incarcerated but even

204. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 189–90; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 185, at 5;
see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, The School-to-Prison Pipeline’s Legal Architecture: Lessons
from the Spring Valley Incident and Its Aftermath, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 115–16 (2017).
205. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, at 103–07.
206. REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 185, at 14, 50–54 (summarizing causes of the pipeline,
and noting large numbers of school-based arrests and law enforcement referrals).
207. TYLER & TRINKNER, supra note 184, at 163.
208. Kim, supra note 60, at 881–82.
209. Ken McGrew traces the origins of the school-to-prison pipeline metaphor from a 2003
academic conference to becoming “dominant” in news reports by 2004. Ken McGrew, The
Dangers of Pipeline Thinking: How the School-to-Prison Pipeline Metaphor Squeezes Out
Complexity, 66 EDUC. THEORY 341, 343–45 (2016).
210. The ABA has established a project on “Reversing the School-to-Prison Pipeline” and
published a report analyzing the pipeline’s causes and possible reforms. School to Prison
Pipeline,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/racial_ethnic_justice/
projects/StPP.html [https://perma.cc/GSX7-FLPP] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see also
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 185. The DOJ has used the phrase in court pleadings. See,
e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States at 4–5, Kenny v. Wilson, No. 2:16-cv-02794CWH (D.S.C. Nov. 28, 2016), ECF No. 86.
211. Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Developmental Due Process: Waging a Constitutional
Campaign to Align School Discipline with Developmental Knowledge, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 929,
962 (2009); see also REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 185, at 50–51.
212. See, e.g., Kaitlin Banner, Breaking the School-to-Prison Pipeline: New Models for
School Discipline and Community Accountable Schools, in A NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM:
TOTAL REFORM FOR A BROKEN SYSTEM 301, 301–02 (Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2015).
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when an arrest did not lead to a juvenile court adjudication.213 Law
enforcement responses to school misbehavior served neither broader school
disciplinary goals—because they harmed the overall school
environment214—nor broader crime control goals—because they increase the
risk of recidivism.215
Beyond these aggregate harms, reformers offered extreme stories of
harmful uses of law enforcement in school discipline, often involving arrests
in response to nonviolent misbehavior, especially by young children,
disproportionate arrests of black youth, and aggressive police searches often
with little or no suspicion.216
These critiques, which are only briefly summarized here, have extended
beyond academics to family court judges who adjudicate school-based
delinquency cases. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges criticized policies and practices which led to arresting and charging
children for relatively minor conduct at school when less formal and less
punitive approaches would have served children better.217 This leading
national group of judges challenged criminalizing “minor infractions” as
filling court dockets with frivolous cases that unnecessarily harmed
children.218 Leading family court judges have written about the harms that
come from arresting and charging children for such incidents.219 Other
professional groups issued similar calls for reform beyond those whose
ideology might make such critiques predictable.
The American
Psychological Association, for instance, argued in 2008 that “minor,
developmentally influenced misbehavior should not be interpreted or dealt
with as a criminal infraction.”220 The Council of State Governments issued
a report recognizing the concern regarding “the ticketing and arresting of
students for minor offenses” and recommending reforms “to keep students
engaged in school and out of the juvenile justice system.”221
Relatively recent high-profile cases have highlighted these critiques—
such as video of an SRO pulling a teenage girl out of her desk and throwing
213. See Alexis Karteron, Arrested Development: Rethinking Fourth Amendment
Standards for Seizures and Uses of Force in Schools, 18 NEV. L.J. 863, 871–77 (2018); Nance,
supra note 189, at 319–21.
214. Nance, supra note 189, at 344–45.
215. Id. at 319–24.
216. See, e.g., KATHLEEN NOLAN, POLICE IN THE HALLWAYS: DISCIPLINE IN AN URBAN HIGH
SCHOOL 19–20 (2011); Banner, supra note 212, at 302; Nance, supra note 3 (manuscript at 4–
5).
217. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUDICIALLY-LED RESPONSES
TO THE SCHOOL PATHWAYS TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM PROJECT background to 1 (2016).
218. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, SCHOOL PATHWAYS TO THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2014).
219. Steven C. Teske & J. Brian Huff, When Did Making Adults Mad Become a Crime?
The Court’s Role in Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, JUV. & FAM. JUST. TODAY,
Winter 2011, at 14, 14–17.
220. Am. Psychological Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies
Effective in the Schools?: An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 852, 858 (2008).
221. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at xvii, 13.
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her across the floor while arresting her for disturbing school by refusing to
put away a cell phone.222 Scholars have cited that case as a leading example
of the harm school policing can create, especially when SROs are involved
in “minor, quotidian in-school misbehavior” and transform such incidents
into law enforcement and juvenile court matters.223
A central target for reforms has been the role of SROs, based explicitly on
the concern that involving SROs in school discipline leads to unnecessary
arrests of students—especially students of color—for what the ABA termed
“trivial infractions.”224 Multiple studies have found that assigning SROs to
schools increased the number of arrests for low-level offenses, even when
taking into account various measures for the rates of crime in and around
schools and legal requirements to report certain crimes to law
enforcement.225 Chongmin Na and Denise Gottfredson found that, after
controlling for previous crime rates, SRO presence led to an increase in the
rate of reporting minor violent crimes—simple assaults and other charges
arising largely from fights between students—showing that “increased use of
SROs facilitates the formal processing of minor offenses.”226 Matthew
Theriot found more nuanced but consistent results: SROs’ presence reduced
the likelihood of school-based arrests for weapons possession (perhaps by
deterring students from bringing weapons to school), a finding in tension
with other studies.227 Even so, Theriot found that SROs’ presence resulted
in an even larger increase—more than 100 percent—in arrests for disorderly
conduct, the most common charge in the jurisdictions studied.228 Judges
have written that SROs’ law enforcement role “dictates” more arrests for
such conduct.229 Reduced Fourth Amendment standards through the
application of T.L.O. to SRO-involved searches surely can contribute to
increased arrests as well.230
These findings, coupled with other factors, increased concern that racial
disparities are particularly—and unjustifiably—large in school-based arrests.
Jason Nance found that the percentage of nonwhite students at a school “is a
strong predictor of whether the school uses a combination of strict security
222. For a summary of this event, how it illustrated the school-to-prison pipeline, and
subsequent state reform efforts, see generally Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204.
223. Fedders, supra note 185, at 576.
224. REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 185, at 14.
225. Id. at 53; Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: Effects
on School Crime and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 619, 642 (2011);
Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
919, 967–70 (2016); Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the Criminalization
of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 282 (2009).
226. Na & Gottfredson, supra note 225, at 640.
227. Compare Theriot, supra note 225, at 285, with Na & Gottfredson, supra note 225, at
642.
228. Theriot, supra note 225, at 285. Theriot’s study—which focused on Clayton County,
Georgia, and Jefferson County, Alaska—controlled for various factors, including economic
disadvantage within the student body, in comparing schools with and without assigned SROs.
Id. at 284–85.
229. Teske & Huff, supra note 219, at 16.
230. Developments in the Law—Policing Students, supra note 82, at 1758–59.
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measures.”231 Nonwhite students, therefore, are more likely to go to a school
with SROs and thus face the results of increased arrests.232 Moreover, in
practice, Nance has shown that “extreme surveillance measures” impose a
range of harms on schools and students.233
These criticisms of the school-to-prison pipeline emphasize one central
proposal: SROs should be less involved in incidents of minor misbehavior,
which should instead be the subject of school discipline.234 As Theriot
explained:
[I]t . . . is important to change teachers’ and school administrators’
expectations of SRO interventions. . . . [T]eachers more often are turning
to police officers to handle difficult students. Teachers and principals are
ignoring the “teachable moments” that come from student misbehavior and
failing to take advantage of opportunities to work with adolescents in
need.235

Relatedly, evidence accumulated to show that using police officers to
enforce school discipline (and the arrests and charges which result) harmed
students. Students who were arrested had higher school dropout and
recidivism rates, and such arrests were not found to improve school discipline
for students who were not punished.236
Courts have also begun to question the policy wisdom of, and raise legal
concerns unrelated to the Fourth Amendment about, involving SROs in
school discipline. Then-Judge Neil Gorsuch critiqued an SRO’s involvement
in a case involving a middle school child’s repeated burping in gym class,
which culminated in the SRO arresting the child for “interfer[ing] with the
educational process.”237 That case provides a vivid illustration of how
stationing SROs at schools and involving them in ordinary school discipline
incidents leads to unnecessary arrests. In that case, a middle schooler
231. Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 41 (2013).
232. Id.
233. See Nance, supra note 3 (manuscript at 55) (“The use of extreme surveillance
measures, especially when applied disproportionately on minority students, delegitimizes the
educational process, harms students’ interests, furthers racial inequalities, weakens trust in
government institutions, skews minorities’ perceptions of their standing in our society, and
sends harmful messages to everyone that students attending majority-white schools have
greater privileges and superior privacy rights.”). To address these harms, Nance recommends
that courts give such measures greater weight when applying a special needs balancing test,
especially to suspicionless searches of large numbers of students. Id. (manuscript at 58–67).
This doctrinal suggestion focuses on improved application of the special needs test; my
recommendation, developed in Part IV, focuses on improved determinations of when that test
applies.
234. See, e.g., Banner, supra note 212, at 306 (calling for efforts to better “define law
enforcement’s mission in school” and noting local efforts to do so); Nance, supra note 189, at
340 (criticizing the use of SROs for “routine discipline matters”).
235. Theriot, supra note 225, at 285 (citation omitted).
236. Kim, supra note 60, at 889–92 (collecting studies).
237. A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2016). The child challenged his
arrest, which was premised on the following state law: “No person shall willfully interfere
with the educational process of any public or private school by committing . . . any act which
would disrupt, impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes, procedures or
functions of a public or private school.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-13(D) (2018).

2019]

REEVALUATING SCHOOL SEARCHES

2045

“generated several fake burps” in gym class, “which made the other students
laugh and hampered class proceedings.”238 The teacher then made the child
sit in the hallway, but the child “leaned into the classroom entranceway and
continued to burp and laugh.”239 The teacher then called the SRO regarding
this repeated childish behavior, and the SRO arrested the child.240 The Tenth
Circuit decided the case based on the scope of the state criminal statute.241
In dissent, Judge Gorsuch harshly criticized the notion that the SRO had any
business in responding to a mildly disruptive student:
If a seventh grader starts trading fake burps for laughs in gym class, what’s
a teacher to do? Order extra laps? Detention? A trip to the principal’s
office? Maybe. But then again, maybe that’s too old school. Maybe today
you call a police officer. And maybe today the officer decides that, instead
of just escorting the now compliant thirteen year old to the principal’s
office, an arrest would be a better idea. So out come the handcuffs and off
goes the child to juvenile detention.242

The result, Gorsuch wrote, was to make the law “a ass.”243
Even more forcefully (if less colorfully), the Fourth Circuit criticized
unnecessary law enforcement responses to routine school disciplinary
matters in E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos.244 That case involved a ten-year-old
elementary school student arrested for a fight with another child on a school
bus several days prior to her arrest.245 She filed a claim for excessive force
against the SRO, who handcuffed her when making the arrest.246 Though
ruling for the SRO on immunity grounds, the Fourth Circuit suggested that
teachers could routinely handle minor fights without SROs or the use of
force.247 It also questioned law enforcement’s response to children who
commit “minor offenses” at school:
Unnecessarily handcuffing and criminally punishing young schoolchildren
is undoubtedly humiliating, scarring, and emotionally damaging. We must
be mindful of the long-lasting impact such actions have on these children
and their ability to flourish and lead prosperous lives—an impact that
should be a matter of grave concern for us all.248

These cases reflect growing concern about the point that was foundational
to Dilworth and other cases applying T.L.O. to school searches—the notion
that SROs are like other school officials and not like law enforcement. The
crux of these criticisms is that SROs are like law enforcement and that law
238. A.M., 830 F.3d at 1129.
239. Id. at 1129–30.
240. Id. at 1130.
241. Id. at 1150 (concluding that the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that the
child had violated the statute and thus that arresting the child was lawful).
242. Id. at 1169 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 1170 (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 520 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1941)
(1838)).
244. 884 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2018).
245. Id. at 176.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 183.
248. Id. at 188.

2046

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

enforcement responses are inappropriate for routine school discipline. As
Part III establishes, that criticism has led to clearer demarcation between law
enforcement and school discipline and a clearer understanding that SROs are
law enforcement, not school officials. Those reforms and demarcations
require a reevaluation of decisions applying T.L.O. to SRO searches.
III. REFORMS DRAW CLEAR LINES BETWEEN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
Courts decided the bulk of cases applying T.L.O. to SRO-involved
searches in the 1990s and 2000s, as the number of SROs was increasing and
as criticisms of SROs’ roles at schools were also growing. In the 2010s, the
reform movement described in Part II.B has taken root, and many
jurisdictions across the United States have turned a corner toward “[t]he
[d]ecriminalization of the [c]lassroom.”249 While much work remains to be
done, we are now in a “children are different”250 era in which a deeper
understanding of adolescent development is fostering reforms designed to
make juvenile justice more rehabilitative and less punitive.251
One set of these reforms is intended to keep children from facing
delinquency and criminal charges for minor school-based misconduct and,
more particularly, constrain the role of SROs so they are not involved in
school discipline. These reforms focus SROs’ time on more serious offenses
requiring law enforcement responses252 and other law enforcement tasks like
“intelligence gathering.”253 Crucially, many recent reforms make that shift
explicit, drawing lines between SROs’ law enforcement focus and school
discipline. Those reforms, therefore, require a reevaluation of cases relying
on the notion that SROs are school officials.
This Part will describe the range of federal, state, and local reforms in the
2010s that have cabined SROs’ work to law enforcement. All of these
reforms share a common central feature: they all limit when SROs can be
involved in school discipline and draw stark lines between law enforcement
and school discipline. While not every jurisdiction has adopted such
249. Jessica Feierman, The Decriminalization of the Classroom: The Supreme Court’s
Evolving Jurisprudence on the Rights of Students, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 301 (2011); see also PADRES
& JÓVENES UNIDOS & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, LESSONS IN RACIAL JUSTICE AND MOVEMENT
BUILDING: DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE IN COLORADO AND NATIONALLY 3
(2014) (“[O]ver the last several years, a vibrant and robust national movement has emerged to
address the School-to-Prison Pipeline, and there has been a dramatic sea change across the
country with regard to school discipline.”).
250. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480–81 (2012).
251. See, e.g., Sayali Himanshu Bapat & Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Is There Justice for
Juveniles in the United States, India, and Italy?: Towards a Framework for Transnational
Comparisons, in THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE FROM A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 37, 45–46 (Tamar R. Birckhead & Solange Mouthaan eds., 2016).
252. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 218, at 11
(“Alternatives to zero tolerance policies will allow non-violent behaviors to be addressed
without officer involvement, providing law enforcement and SROs more time to focus on
violent offenses.”).
253. Teske & Huff, supra note 219, at 17.
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reforms—and thus not every jurisdiction faces the Fourth Amendment
implications of those reforms discussed in Part IV—a geographically and
politically diverse set of state and local governments have enacted these
reforms.
A. Federal Reforms Push States and Localities to Limit SROs’ Roles
The federal government has taken several steps in recent years to limit
SROs’ role to law enforcement. First, in 2014, the U.S. Department of
Education (DOE) published “Guiding Principles” regarding school
discipline.254 Those principles included “focus[ing] officers’ roles primarily
on safety.”255 The DOE recommended that schools collaborate with local
law enforcement agencies, but for discrete purposes distinct from general
school discipline—for example, to develop plans for emergencies and for
students returning to school after juvenile justice commitments.256 One of
the DOE’s guiding principles was that SROs’ role should be “focused on
protecting the physical safety of the school,” policing “criminal conduct of
persons other than students,” and “reducing inappropriate student referrals to
law enforcement.”257 The DOE’s vision for SROs was thus one focused on
law enforcement: SROs should “not become involved in routine school
disciplinary matters,” and schools should not refer such matters to law
enforcement.258
Two years later, the DOJ and DOE issued joint guidelines for SROs with
the explicit goal “to close a school-to-prison pipeline.”259 Two of their
central recommendations are to “[e]liminate the involvement of SROs in
non-criminal matters” and for schools and law enforcement agencies to enter
into memoranda of understanding that clarify that SROs and school officials
have “different roles,” especially related to minor school misbehavior.260
Criticisms of the school-to-prison pipeline and concerns about the harms
caused by turning disciplinary matters into delinquency cases animated the
DOE’s guidance. The DOE noted that keeping SROs focused on law
enforcement improved both academic outcomes and school safety.261 It
254. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPROVING
SCHOOL CLIMATE AND DISCIPLINE (2014).
255. Id. at 3.
256. Id. at 8–9.
257. Id. at 9.
258. Id.; see also id. at 10 (“[SROs’] role should be focused on school safety, with the
responsibility for addressing and preventing serious, real, and immediate threats to the
physical safety of the school and its community. By contrast, school administrators and staff
should have the role of maintaining order and handling routine disciplinary matters.”).
259. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Safe School-Based
Enforcement Through Collaboration, Understanding, and Respect (SECURe) State and Local
Policy Rubric 9 (May 27, 2018) [hereinafter SECURe Rubric]. The departments released this
document in 2016. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release No. 16-1024, Obama
Administration Releases Resources for Schools, Colleges to Ensure Appropriate Use of
School Resource Officers and Campus Police (Sept. 8, 2016).
260. SECURe Rubric, supra note 259, at 9.
261. Id. at 10.
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further noted the value of reducing law enforcement referrals and juvenile
justice system involvement, which reduces the collateral consequences of
such involvement.262 On that issue, the DOE is supported by research
showing that arrests or charges—even when they are ultimately dismissed—
increase the risk that children will drop out of high school.263 The DOE
echoed concerns raised by critics of the school-to-prison pipeline about racial
disproportionality in school-based arrests.264
The Trump administration has indicated its approval of a central pillar of
these reforms—the distinction between SROs’ law enforcement role and
school discipline—even though it has indicated that it is likely to rescind
related Obama administration guidance regarding school discipline.265 The
Trump administration convened a Federal Commission on School Safety in
the aftermath of the February 2018 mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School, and this Commission expressed doubts about the
Obama administration’s focus on reducing racial disparities in school
discipline and asserted that this guidance may have had a “chilling effect on
classroom teachers’ and administrators’ use of discipline.”266 Whatever the
merits or demerits of the Commission’s view on that point,267 its discussion
of SROs, however, is consistent with the Obama administration’s
commitment to distinguishing between their law enforcement duties and
school discipline. The Commission focused on SROs’ special law
enforcement training—they are “best positioned to respond to acts of
violence,”268 and the Commission emphasized the importance of clearly
defining SROs’ roles as compared with school staff.269 The Commission
cited only one model definition, and that example provides that SROs “will
not be used to enforce” school district rules.270
Moreover, the reforms that the Obama-era guidance furthered have
continued to be implemented at the state and local level, in both politically
262. Id. at 9.
263. See generally David S. Kirk & Robert J. Sampson, Juvenile Arrest and Collateral
Educational Damage in the Transition to Adulthood, 86 SOC. EDUC. 36 (2013); Gary Sweeten,
Who Will Graduate?: Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement,
23 JUST. Q. 462 (2006).
264. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 254, at 9.
265. FED. COMM’N ON SCH. SAFETY, FINAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COMMISSION ON
SCHOOL SAFETY 72 (2018), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/school-safetyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAC4-KZPQ]].
266. Id. at 67.
267. For an early critique of the Trump administration’s hostility to the Obama
administration’s school discipline guidance, see Derek Black, Zero Tolerance Discipline
Policies Won’t Fix School Shootings, CONVERSATION (Mar. 15, 2018, 6:44 AM),
https://theconversation.com/zero-tolerance-discipline-policies-wont-fix-school-shootings93399 [https://perma.cc/3J6U-HZ9M].
268. FED. COMM’N ON SCH. SAFETY, supra note 265, at 101.
269. Id.
270. The Commission cited the Montgomery County (Maryland) Public Schools’ MOU
with local law enforcement agencies. Id. at 102. That memo distinguishes SROs’ from school
discipline. Memorandum of Understanding Between Montgomery County Public Schools
et al. 3 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org/uploadedFiles/departments/
security-new/Executed%20SRO%20MOU.PDF [https://perma.cc/RPQ5-N27L].

2019]

REEVALUATING SCHOOL SEARCHES

2049

liberal and conservative jurisdictions, as described in the next several
sections. That guidance has wide bipartisan support, evident in a 2014 report
from the bipartisan Council on State Governments, whose title emphasized
the “consensus” nature of its recommendations.271 A core theme in the
Council’s recommendations is drawing a line between law enforcement and
school discipline and establishing policies to ensure SROs “are not used for
classroom management and routine discipline.”272 Those recommendations
echoed the federal guidance regarding limiting SROs’ role—they called for
clear policies to prevent school officials from involving SROs in routine
student disciplinary matters and noted increasing opposition from both law
enforcement and educators to SRO involvement in such matters.273
B. State Reforms from Multiple Angles: South Carolina
One particularly dramatic set of reforms was enacted in South Carolina
following the well-publicized use of force by an SRO against a student at
Spring Valley High School in Columbia.274 An SRO was called to assist a
teacher and school administrator with a school discipline matter—the student
refused to put away her cell phone—and the SRO arrested her for disturbing
school.275 In the county where that incident occurred, the local sheriff’s
department and school district revised their memoranda of agreement to
provide that “[f]irst and foremost the SROs will perform law enforcement
duties” and that “[t]he SRO shall not act as a school disciplinarian, as
disciplining students is a school responsibility.”276 In addition, in August
2016, the Richland County Sheriff’s Department entered into a voluntary
agreement with the DOJ.277 The voluntary agreement provides, perhaps
more broadly, that SROs should not engage “in classroom management or
school discipline matters that should be appropriately handled by school
staff.”278
271. The title was “The School Discipline Consensus Report: Strategies from the Field to
Keep Students Engaged in School and Out of the Juvenile Justice System.” MORGAN ET AL.,
supra note 82; see also id. at x (describing the “consensus-based” process behind the report,
which included input from school administrators, police, juvenile justice agencies, and others).
272. Id. at 186.
273. Id. at 213–15, 220.
274. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, at 84–85. That incident has become a leading
illustration of the school-to-prison pipeline. See, e.g., CARA DRINAN, THE WAR ON KIDS: HOW
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE LOST ITS WAY 46 (2018).
275. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, at 84–85.
276. 2017–18 Memorandum of Agreement between Richland County School District One,
and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department 3 (Apr. 1, 2017) (on file with author)
[hereinafter 2017–18 MOA]. I have criticized that memorandum for not including enough
reforms and, in particular, for its language that requires school officials to report all crimes to
SROs. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, at 137–38. That critique goes not to the existence of a
line between law enforcement and school discipline, but to where to place that line.
277. Letter from Michael Alston et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Leon Lott, Sheriff,
Richland Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Aug. 10, 2016), https://ojp.gov/about/ocr/pdfs/RCSD-SROComplianceReview-08102016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH9U-EJ9T] (regarding the compliance
review of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department).
278. Voluntary Resolution Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice
and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department para. 4 (Aug. 9, 2016), https://ojp.gov/about/
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In 2017, the South Carolina Department of Education adopted regulations
that require a similar approach across the state.279 The regulations explicitly
“distinguish school discipline from law enforcement and prohibit the
involvement of school resource officers in school discipline.”280 The
regulations categorize student misbehavior into three categories. Even the
names of these categories reflect a line between discipline and law
enforcement—the two less severe categories, “behavioral misconduct” and
“disruptive conduct,” do not suggest the need for law enforcement
involvement, in contrast to the most severe category, “criminal conduct.”281
The regulations provide a list of allowed responses to each category of
misbehavior and makes clear that SRO involvement is limited. No SRO
involvement is permitted for “behavioral misconduct.”282 At the other end
of the spectrum, the regulations provide that “criminal conduct” “usually
require[s] . . . the intervention of the School Resource Officer or other local
law enforcement authorities.”283 As the phrase “criminal conduct” suggests,
all behavior listed in that category violates the criminal law.284 Still, these
regulations reflect the desire to prevent SROs’ involvement with misbehavior
that could be considered criminal but is better handled by school officials.
The regulation excludes from its list of “criminal conduct” minor offenses,
including disturbing schools, breach of peace, disorderly conduct, and
assaults that do not “pose a . . . serious threat to the safety of oneself or others
in school.”285 In the middle ground, “disruptive conduct” may lead to law
enforcement referral when “the conduct rises to a level of criminality” and
“the conduct presents an immediate safety risk to one or more people or it is
the third or subsequent act which rises to a level of criminality in that school
year.”286 The essence of these regulations is to permit schools to refer
misbehavior to SROs only when incidents create a security threat or are
severe enough to require a law enforcement response; otherwise, SROs
should not be involved. Finally, schools must include all of these limitations

ocr/pdfs/RCSD-SRO-ComplianceReview-08102016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MH9U-EJ9T].
For a more detailed discussion of the voluntary agreement, see Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204,
at 136–37.
279. Shortly after the Spring Valley incident, the South Carolina Department of Education
convened a Safe Schools Task Force, which recommended new regulation regarding SROs
and revisions to an existing regulation regarding school discipline codes. See S.C. DEP’T OF
EDUC., SOUTH CAROLINA SAFE SCHOOLS TASKFORCE REPORT 5 (2016), http://ed.sc.gov/
newsroom/public-information-resources/south-carolina-safe-schools-taskforce-report/
[https://perma.cc/7XGU-SBHR].
280. 41 S.C. Reg. § 43-210(V) (May 26, 2017).
281. 41 S.C. Reg. § 43-279(IV) (May 26, 2017).
282. The regulation excludes an SRO or law enforcement referral from its list of
enforcement procedures. Id. § 43-279(IV)(A)(3). The Department proposed these regulations
in a document with tables listing possible consequences for different levels of misconduct.
The table for behavioral misconduct shaded in the column for “call to law enforcement,”
indicating it is not a permitted option. See S.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 279.
283. See S.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 279, at 12–13.
284. 41 S.C. Reg. § 43-279(IV)(C)(2) (May 26, 2017).
285. Id. § 43-279(IV)(C)(2)(a), (3).
286. Id. § 43-279(IV)(B)(3)(d).
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on SRO involvement in memoranda of understanding with local law
enforcement agencies to keep SROs out of school discipline.287
Moreover, the South Carolina General Assembly made the line between
law enforcement and school discipline clearer by significantly narrowing the
scope of a criminal statute banning school disturbances.288 That statute made
it a crime “for any person willfully or unnecessarily to interfere with or to
disturb in any way or in any place the students or teachers of any school or
college in this State.”289 That broad language echoed similar language in
multiple other states, and a series of legislative, judicial, and administrative
decisions had broadened its scope over the years, until it became commonly
used for school misbehavior and, eventually, the second-most frequent
charge referred to South Carolina family courts.290 It was also the charge
filed in the Spring Valley incident.291 Now, the statute is significantly
narrowed so it does not apply to students properly at school.292 The result is
that most student misbehavior—such as the disobedience at issue in the
Spring Valley incident,293 loud or rude back talk, or the burping at issue in
A.M. v. Holmes294—is now excluded from the criminal law, which makes the
line between SROs’ law enforcement duties and school discipline easier to
enforce.
C. Ferguson, Missouri, Reforms Build a Sharper Division Between
Law Enforcement and School Discipline
Ferguson, Missouri, presents another leading example of school-to-prison
pipeline reforms that prevent SRO involvement in general school discipline.
Following the high-profile police shooting of an unarmed black man and
ensuing mass protest, the DOJ opened a wide-ranging investigation into the
Ferguson Police Department, which led to a series of critical findings,
including some regarding SROs.295 The DOJ found that the Department’s
SROs “treat[ed] routine discipline issues as criminal matters.”296 This
problem resulted, in part, from the failure of an MOU between the police
287. 41 S.C. Reg. § 43-210(V) (May 26, 2017).
288. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2018).
289. Id.
290. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, at 102–03. Disturbing school referrals declined
dramatically after the Spring Valley incident, but it still ranked as the fifth most frequent
charge statewide. Id. at 130. For a review of how the statute gradually expanded over the
years, see generally Kristen Coble, Note, Disturbing Schools Law in South Carolina, 69 S.C.
L. REV. 859 (2018).
291. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, at 93.
292. The revised statute applies to “a person who is not a student,” defined as someone not
enrolled at school or who is suspended or expelled from the school, and who engages in certain
listed actions. B. 182, 122d Gen. Assemb. § 1 (S.C. 2018) (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 1617-420 (2018)). Threatening to kill or physically injure remains outlawed. Id. § 2 (codified at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-425 (2018)).
293. See supra notes 274–78 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 237–43 and accompanying text.
295. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015).
296. Id. at 37.
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department and local schools to “clearly define the SROs’ role or limit SRO
involvement in cases of routine discipline or classroom management.”297 As
a result, the Ferguson Police Department filed multiple charges against
schoolchildren for failure to comply, peace disturbance, and similarly petty
charges, which triggered concerns about criminalizing school discipline. The
DOJ investigation reported that “SROs told us that they viewed increased
arrests in the schools as a positive result,” which indicated a “failure of
training” and lack of appreciation for the harmful effects of criminalizing
disciplinary infractions.298
The remedy for these problems explicitly involved drawing sharper lines
between law enforcement and school discipline. The DOJ’s investigation
included a set of recommendations, including that SROs avoid
“unnecessarily treating disciplinary issues as criminal matters.”299 DOJ and
city officials subsequently negotiated a detailed consent decree with various
provisions under the heading “SRO Non-Involvement in School
Discipline.”300 Those provisions explicitly treat SROs as providing security
and law enforcement services separate from school disciplinary purposes.
The core element of the consent decree is that SRO involvement is limited to
situations posing a physical safety risk and is expressly forbidden in any
situation that can be “safely and appropriately” handled by the school’s
internal disciplinary team.301 The consent decree designates “minor offenses
committed by students,” such as disorderly conduct, trespassing, “and
fighting not involving a weapon and not resulting in physical injury,” as
disciplinary matters that should not trigger SRO involvement.302 When
SROs are involved for security reasons, the consent decree requires them to
“de-escalate the situation” and then end their involvement and refer the
matter to school officials “at the earliest opportunity.”303
Not only does this consent decree exclude SROs from school discipline,
but its language places SROs alongside other law enforcement officers—not
school officials. The consent decree refers to “SROs and other [Ferguson
Police Department] officers” three separate times,304 language that treats
SROs like other law enforcement officers and not like school officials.
D. Local Memoranda of Understanding and Other Reforms
Limit SROs’ Role
The elements recommended by federal proposals and present in South
Carolina and Ferguson, Missouri, reforms are also evident in a range of local
297. Id.
298. Id. at 38.
299. Id. at 94.
300. Consent Decree at 50, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180-CDP
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016).
301. Id. para. 212.
302. Id.
303. Id. para. 213. The consent decree also required the city to enter in an MOU with the
school district that included the consent decree’s requirements. Id. para. 211.
304. Id. paras. 212–13, 222.
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reforms. They are particularly notable in local MOUs, including those which
the DOJ listed as illustrative of good school and law enforcement
collaborations.305 Such agreements are particularly important because of the
consensus that schools and law enforcement agencies should enter them and
that they “should clearly state the roles and responsibilities” of SROs and
school officials.306 The federal government has advised that MOUs should
distinguish SROs’ law enforcement roles from school discipline by explicitly
providing that SROs should not be involved in the latter.307
Denver’s 2013 agreement,308 which the DOJ cited as a model MOU,309
provides a leading example of recent agreements that separate school
discipline from law enforcement and limit SROs’ work to the latter. This
agreement followed statewide legislation that declared the harms from
referring children to law enforcement and that “[i]nvolvement of students in
the criminal or juvenile justice systems should be avoided when addressing
minor misbehavior.”310 The law “encouraged” schools to consider several
factors before referring incidents to law enforcement, including a student’s
age, disciplinary history, and disability (if any), as well as the severity of the
misbehavior and “[w]hether a lesser intervention would properly address”
the situation.311 The Denver agreement put those legislative declarations into
practice. This agreement includes some general language about how SROs
contribute to schools’ overall learning environment;312 more specific
provisions provide a distinct line between SROs’ core law enforcement
duties and schools’ discipline duties. Crucially, the agreement states that
“the primary duty of an SRO is to handle criminal matters at the school.”313
To enforce this rule, the agreement requires SROs to “differentiate between
disciplinary issues and crime problems and respond appropriately.”314 The
agreement requires SROs to “understand” that the school seeks to “minimize

305. See SECURe Rubric, supra note 259.
306. NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43126, SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 11 (2013); see also
MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 186 (encouraging the use of MOUs “to help ensure proper
implementation and accountability” of SRO programs).
307. Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet:
Memorandum of Understanding for FY 2013 School-Based Partnerships 2 (2013),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2013_MOU-FactSheet_v2_091613.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8RVMK6T].
308. Intergovernmental Agreement Concerning the Funding, Implementation and
Administration of Programs Involving Police Officers in Schools, Agreed to by the City and
County of Denver, and the Denver Public Schools (2013) [hereinafter Denver
Intergovernmental
Agreement],
http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/e746ea2668c2ed19b3_
urm6iv28k.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA7K-DG6G].
309. SECURe Rubric, supra note 259, at 8.
310. H.B. 12-1345, 68th Gen. Assemb. § 21(1)(b) (Colo. 2012); see also PADRES &
JÓVENES UNIDOS & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 249, at 25–27 (describing legislative
advocacy and reforms in that bill).
311. H.B. 12-1345 § 21(1)(f)(III)(F).
312. Denver Intergovernmental Agreement, supra note 308, at 2.
313. Id. at 4.
314. Id. at 2.
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the use of law enforcement intervention” in response to disciplinary issues.315
This agreement followed local activism calling for SROs to “only be used for
appropriate purposes,”316 and activists hailed Denver Public Schools’ 57
percent reduction in its rate of referring children to law enforcement.317
Like Colorado, Utah enacted legislation in 2016, which required local law
enforcement agencies and school districts to develop agreements that
distinguish school discipline from law enforcement.318 The Utah law
requires local entities to identify “offenses that are administrative issues” and
which SROs must leave to school administrators to handle.319 Other
“offenses,” including “minor” criminal violations, require SROs to “confer”
with school officials—this creates a process by which SROs and school
officials can define the line between law enforcement and discipline.320
The nation’s two largest school systems have adopted similar reforms.
Officials in New York City agreed to an MOU in 1998 which explicitly
empowered SROs to enforce school disciplinary rules in addition to criminal
laws and “encourage[d]” school staff to “avail themselves of appropriate
NYPD input and assistance” in enforcing school discipline.321 Fifteen years
later, New York City schools embarked on various reforms based on the
“recognition that non-criminal, school-based discipline matters are best
addressed by school staff” and not by the NYPD’s School Safety Division.322
New York officials dated these reforms to 2012 and credited them with a
29 percent decline in arrests at school from 2012–2015.323 In 2014, the Los
Angeles School Police Department adopted a new policy governing SRO
response to “minor law violations” based explicitly on the federal guidance
discussed in Part III.A.324 The Department made plain that school police

315. Id.
316. PADRES & JÓVENES UNIDOS & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 249, at 27.
317. Id. at 32.
318. School Resource Officers and School Administrators Training and Agreement, H.B.
460, 61st Leg., 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-8-703
(2017)).
319. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-8-703(d) (2017).
320. Id. § 53G-8-703(c).
321. Memorandum of Understanding Among the Board of Education of the City of New
York, the Chancellor of the City School District of the City of New York and the City of New
York on the Performance of School Security Functions by the New York City Police
Department for the Benefit of the City School District of the City of New York and Its Students
and Staff paras. 2, 18 (Sept. 17, 1998), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
4163589/NYC-Current-MOU.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NDW-2S7J]. While the original MOU
was only in effect for four years, New York City officials extended it indefinitely in 2003. Id.
para. 24; Letter of Agreement Regarding Continuation of the September 17, 1998,
Memorandum of Understanding on the Performance of School Security Functions 17 (Jan. 22,
2003).
322. MAYOR’S LEADERSHIP TEAM ON SCH. CLIMATE & DISCIPLINE, MAINTAINING THE
MOMENTUM:
A PLAN FOR SAFETY AND FAIRNESS IN SCHOOLS:
PHASE TWO
RECOMMENDATIONS 39 (2016).
323. Id. Those same officials recommended memorializing these changes in a revised
memorandum. Id.
324. Steven K. Zipperman, Chief of Police, L.A. Sch. Police Dep’t, Roles and
Responsibilities for: Enforcement, Citation and Arrest Protocols on School Campus and Safe
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officers “enforce the law” and “do not respond to routine school discipline
matters” absent a safety need.325 The policy reiterates in several ways a line
between SROs’ law enforcement duties and schools’ broader discipline
goals.326
Other jurisdictions have similarly reformed the role of their SROs. The
MOU between law enforcement and the school district in Broward County,
Florida, similarly states that SROs do not provide school discipline.327 To
distinguish law enforcement from school discipline roles—and thus enforce
that limitation on SRO roles—Broward County’s agreement created a school
discipline matrix that defined when school officials were supposed to refer
matters to SROs; otherwise, school officials should intervene on their
own.328 San Francisco, California, public schools entered into an MOU in
2013 which provided that school staff may only request assistance from
SROs “when . . . necessary to protect the physical safety of students and
staff,” to address a crime by a nonstudent, and when required by law—and
“not . . . in a situation that can be safely and appropriately handled by the
District’s internal disciplinary procedures.”329 Kentucky officials adopted a
model MOU that emphasizes that an “SRO shall not act as a school
disciplinarian,” a task that falls to school officials.330
The DOJ also noted model MOUs presented by the Pennsylvania
Department of Education, which emphasize that SROs should not provide

Passages 1 (2014), http://www.fixschooldiscipline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/LASPDArrest-and-Citation-Reform-Policy.-8-15-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/K66E-67WP].
325. See id.
326. See id. at 2 (providing that SROs should focus on school safety, “not . . . enforce
school discipline,” and that school officials, not SROs, should handle “minor offenses of the
law,” and additionally requiring SROs to consider if school officials could adequately respond
to an incident and, if so, refer the matter to school administrators, removing themselves from
the response); id. at 4 (listing various offenses, including fighting and theft under $50 as
requiring school administrative responses).
327. SECURe Rubric, supra note 259, at 9–12; see also id. at 10 (“[T]he school principal
and their designees will be the primary source of intervention and disciplinary
consequences.”).
328. Id. at 10–11. Notably, the Trump administration’s criticism of Obama-era discipline
guidance focused on Broward County’s reform, especially because the Parkland, Florida,
school shooting occurred there. Erica L. Green, Trump Finds Unlikely Culprit in School
Shootings:
Obama Discipline Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/us/politics/trump-school-shootings-obama-disciplinepolicies.html [https://perma.cc/BXB8-CN6S]. Local school officials maintained their
commitment to the program. See id. (quoting the Broward County superintendent as stating,
“We’re not going to dismantle a program that’s been successful in the district because of false
information.”).
329. Memorandum of Understanding Between the San Francisco Police Department and
the San Francisco Unified School District 6 (2013). The Council of State Governments cited
this MOU as a model in 2014. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 421 n.123.
330. School Resource Officer Agreement, KY. CTR. FOR SCH. SAFETY,
https://www.kycss.org/pdfs-docs/clearpdf/issuesbriefs/sromoa.pdf [https://perma.cc/49LV4ZV4] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see also School Resource Officers, KY. CTR. FOR SCH.
SAFETY, https://www.kycss.org/schoolresource.php [https://perma.cc/Y5AM-GA5T] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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regular school discipline.331 Both example models state that SROs must not
act as school disciplinarians.332 The Department also offered model SRO job
descriptions that emphasize that an SRO serves in “a sworn law-enforcement
position” and must be “[a]ble to differentiate what constitutes a crime and
what incidents are school conduct violations.”333 Despite some general
language suggesting that SROs serve both law enforcement and school
discipline goals,334 more specific lists of core job functions emphasize SROs’
law enforcement duties and preparation for and response to emergency
situations.335
The Trump administration’s Federal Commission on School Safety cited
the Montgomery County, Maryland, 2017 MOU, which provides similar
distinctions.336 That MOU explicitly provides that SROs “will not . . .
enforce” school district rules.337 Moreover, the MOU made clear that
relatively minor incidents on the line between school discipline and law
enforcement need not be reported to SROs. Only “critical incidents” must
be reported, defined as assaults “that require[] medical attention outside of
the school health room,” thefts of property worth $500 or more, weapon
possession, or possession of drugs with the intent to distribute them.338 Less
severe offenses—most fights, petty thefts, and simple possession of drugs—
would not trigger that reporting requirement and thus could receive a school
disciplinary response only.
The National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO)—a
private organization which advocates for the importance of SROs and for
model SRO programs and trainings—also emphasizes the primacy of SROs’
law enforcement role. NASRO explains that SROs are police officers who
serve “as part of a total community-policing strategy” and spend most of their
time “on school-safety and law-enforcement activities.”339 Their law
enforcement expertise helps SROs investigate and respond to suspected
331. SECURe Rubric, supra note 259, at 2–3. The model MOUs are included in a state
agency’s request for grant applications from police departments and municipalities. See
generally Penn. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Safe Schools Targeted Grants for School Resource
Officer, Municipality/Police Department Request for Application 2017–2018 [hereinafter
Penn. SRO Application], https://www.education.pa.gov/Documents/K-12/Safe%20Schools/
Safe%20Schools%20Targeted%20Grants/2017-2018/2017-2018%20Safe%20Schools%20
Initiative%20-%20Municipality%20SRO%20-%20RFA.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7A5-F7GN]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
332. Example 1 states that “[t]he school resource officer shall not act as a school
disciplinarian, as disciplining students is a school responsibility.” Penn. SRO Application,
supra note 331, app. A at 9. Example 2 states that the SRO “[w]ill not be involved in ordinary
school discipline, unless it pertains to preventing a potential disruption and/or climate that
places students at risk of harm. Disciplining students is a School District responsibility . . . .”
Id. app. A at 15.
333. Id. app. B at 21.
334. See id. app. B at 18 (Purpose Statement).
335. See id. app. B at 18–19, 21–22.
336. FED. COMM’N ON SCH. SAFETY, supra note 265, at 102.
337. Montgomery County MOU, supra note 270, at 3.
338. Id. at 7–9.
339. NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, TO PROTECT & EDUCATE: THE SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICER AND THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS 23 (2012).
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crimes and threats “larger than an isolated fight.”340 This law enforcement
focus requires a line between SROs and school discipline; NASRO identifies
a “best practice” for situations when an SRO identifies a school rule
violation: the SRO should “tak[e] the student(s) to where school discipline
can be determined solely by school officials.”341
School districts and law enforcement agencies’ MOUs have explicitly
cited NASRO for the propositions that
the SRO is first and foremost a law enforcement officer . . . . Enforcement
of the code of student conduct is the responsibility of teachers and
administrators. The SRO shall refrain from being involved in the
enforcement of disciplinary rules that do not constitute violations of law,
except to support staff in maintaining a safe school environment.342

The examples described in this section are not exhaustive. A “growing
number” of MOUs contain similar limitations and school districts’ codes of
conduct “increasingly” include provisions that call on school staff to refer
matters to SROs only when the seriousness of the act, prior violations, and
the student’s age and grade make it appropriate.343
IV. RECONSIDERING SCHOOL-SEARCH STANDARDS IN AN AGE OF REFORM
In the 1990s and 2000s, Dilworth and other cases applying the majority
rule drew a line between SROs and outside police officers for Fourth
Amendment purposes.344 The reforms described in Part III occurred in the
2010s and drew the line at a different spot—between SROs, who focus on
law enforcement, and school officials, who manage school discipline. Where
Dilworth described an SRO with power to impose school discipline on
students and other cases described SROs as obliged to cooperate with school
officials, these reforms limit SROs to law enforcement roles and direct them
to not intervene in routine school disciplinary matters.345
Applying the Fourth Amendment principles discussed in Part I to this new
line requires reevaluating the majority rule. This new distinction (in
jurisdictions governed by such reforms) aligns with what critics have
argued—SROs are law enforcement officers, and Fourth Amendment
doctrine should treat them as such. Especially in jurisdictions that have
340. Id. at 24.
341. Id. at 23.
342. 2013–2017 School Resource Officer Memorandum of Understanding Between the
City of Ashland Police Department and the Ashland School District 2–3 (2017),
http://www.ashland.or.us/files/police_and_school_mou.atch.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PJ688HQS] (“The SRO Program shall utilize the SRO Triad concept as set forth by
NASRO . . . .”).
343. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 217. The Council’s report lists examples in
Baltimore, Maryland; Buffalo, New York; Chicago, Illinois; Fort Wayne, Indiana; and San
Diego, California. Id. at 217–18.
344. See supra Part I.C.
345. Compare Part III (describing reforms), with People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 313
(Ill. 1996) (noting that the SRO “was authorized to give a detention”), and Cason v. Cook,
810 F.2d 188, 190 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The liaison officer is instructed to cooperate with the
school officials.”).
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engaged in reforms along the lines described in Part III, a search involving
an SRO is now unmistakably a search entangled with law enforcement
purposes and thus cannot seriously be considered a search serving a “special
need[], beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”346
This Part makes that doctrinal argument in two settings—first, in the
relatively easy case when SROs are directly involved in conducting a search,
and, second, in the more difficult case in which SROs are not involved in a
search itself but by contractual agreement or other force of law, school
officials must turn over evidence of crimes from such searches to SROs. In
both categories, reforms that emphasize SROs’ law enforcement, and not
school discipline, roles support the conclusion that T.L.O. does not generally
apply to SROs.
A. Applying the Supreme Court’s Principles Leads to T.L.O.’s
Inapplicability to SRO-Involved Searches
T.L.O.’s holding that school officials can generally search students with
only reasonable suspicion—and without probable cause or a warrant—
depends on the unique needs of school discipline and the relationships
between educators and students.347 In reform jurisdictions, SROs’ focus is
now more clearly on law enforcement, not school discipline. SROs therefore
do not need “a certain degree of flexibility” because that flexibility belongs
“in school disciplinary procedures.”348 Nor do they need a Fourth
Amendment standard that lets them implement “swift and informal
disciplinary procedures.”349 State courts applying the minority rule
emphasized facts that showed a now more common line between law
enforcement and discipline, such as an informal agreement between an SRO
and a principal to follow such a line or the absence of authority in an SRO to
impose any school discipline.350
The argument is not that SROs will operate like all other police officers,
but that SROs’ jobs distinguish them from the school disciplinary purposes
that provide the foundation of T.L.O.’s reduced Fourth Amendment standard.
In addition to enforcing the law in response to relatively serious crimes
committed at school, SROs will continue to work to prevent crimes by
working to keep children from joining gangs, educating children about the
law, and even mentoring children.351 Like other community-policing tasks,
those activities serve crime-prevention goals that do not distinguish SROs for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Rather than those tasks, it was work as a
member of a school team imposing school discipline that state courts found
justified applying T.L.O. to SRO-involved searches.352 Thus, it is reforms
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See supra notes 38–55 and accompanying text.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
Id.
See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
See MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 197.
See supra Part I.C.
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that prevent SROs from engaging in routine school discipline that requires
reevaluating such decisions.
Moreover, knowing that SROs will not engage in routine disciplinary
incidents necessarily communicates to students that an SRO’s involvement
changes the character of any interaction involving a search that does occur
between students and SROs. Where teachers and other school officials see
children in class and at lunch and must respond to the multitude of major and
minor disruptions each day caused by juvenile behavior, SROs are called in
only in narrower situations. In such situations, the SRO’s mere presence
communicates to students that the incident is no longer between the student
and the school but is now a matter for law enforcement.353 That clarity makes
it less likely that SROs can develop the “close association” that Justice
Powell saw between educators and students and frames those interactions
“adversar[ially]” as any other interaction between police and criminal
suspects.354
Justice Blackmun’s T.L.O. concurrence—whose language forms the basis
of later Supreme Court cases—even more directly leads to this conclusion.
T.L.O. only applies when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement,” so require.355 When an SRO, who state and local policy define
as a law enforcement official and who may only become involved in searches
or seizures related to criminal law enforcement situations, gets involved, the
situation has crossed the line from special need to law enforcement.
Litigation in Tennessee from the early part of the present reform era
follows the model of this argument. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that
the standard that properly applies to an SRO depends on whether SROs more
closely resemble law enforcement officers or school officials, but it did not
decide which standard should apply in the case before it, instead remanding
for further factual development.356 On remand, an intermediate appellate
court held in an unpublished opinion that the SRO was a law enforcement
officer and therefore needed probable cause before conducting the search at
issue.357 The court began by reviewing the relevant MOU, which specified
that the SRO will not serve as a school disciplinarian—a school
responsibility—and described the SRO’s role in multiple places as relating
to law enforcement duties.358 In addition, the SRO worked for the local law
enforcement agency, wore a uniform at the school, was armed, drove to
school in a marked police car, participated in a range of law enforcement
activities, and was perceived by others at the school as a law enforcement
officer.359
353. See Holland, supra note 142, at 77–78 (describing how SROs’ role shapes the nature
of SRO-student interactions).
354. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348–49 (Powell, J., concurring).
355. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
356. R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 370 (Tenn. 2008).
357. State v. R.D.S., No. M2008-01724-COA-R3-JV, 2009 WL 2136324, at *8 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2009).
358. Id. at *5–6.
359. Id. at *7.
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Applying this approach should lead to the same result in jurisdictions that
have adopted the reforms discussed in Part III, or similar reforms. There,
state and local authorities have drawn a line between school officials and
SROs. The former are in charge of school discipline—the special need that
justifies the exception from the warrant and probable cause requirements
under T.L.O. The latter have law enforcement purposes, and they do not
work toward the special need identified in T.L.O.
Applying this standard will necessarily involve close analysis of SROs’
function in both policy and practice, a point which may vary from one school
district to another. State and local laws, local MOUs, and local policies and
practices all will bear significantly on the analysis. A jurisdiction that rejects
the reforms described in Part III could convincingly show that nothing there
has changed since the majority rule following Dilworth was cemented in the
1990s and early 2000s.360
Notably, NASRO agrees with this general approach. When SROs respond
to incidents directly, they “engage[] in routine law-enforcement activities
indistinguishable from duties performed off campus” and “[s]tandard Fourth
Amendment requirements govern.”361 But NASRO seeks to limit this
conclusion, citing the Tennessee case discussed above362 to caution local
governments to not enter a “flawed MOU” that could deny SROs the ability
to use T.L.O.363 Putting aside the policy wisdom of that position,364 it is
difficult to see how a state or local jurisdiction can keep SROs focused on
law enforcement and not school discipline without creating the implication
that SROs should not qualify for the T.L.O. standard when they are involved
in conducting searches.
NASRO does not, however, extend this position to searches led by school
officials that involve SROs. NASRO asserts that when assisting an educator
in a search that the educator initiates, the SRO is acting in “educator-support
mode” and T.L.O. applies.365 The reforms described in Part III, however,
make it hard to endorse the notion that an “educator-support mode” should
trump an SRO’s law enforcement roles. Calling in an SRO is fully
appropriate when the situation requires law enforcement. And it comes with
consequences—both to the individual suspected of wrongdoing, who may be
arrested by that officer, and to the Fourth Amendment standard. That is, the
line between law enforcement and school discipline—a line NASRO itself
endorses—means that involving SROs changes the character of the school
officials’ search.

360. Such a jurisdiction would still be vulnerable to the doctrinal critiques discussed in Part
I.D and the policy critiques discussed in Part II.B.
361. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, supra note 339, at 35.
362. See R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn. 2008).
363. NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, supra note 339, at 48.
364. The policy benefits of not applying T.L.O. to SRO-involved searches are discussed in
Part IV.C.
365. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, supra note 339, at 36.
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B. Reforms Also Render T.L.O. Inapplicable to Searches by School
Officials Under Policies Requiring Referrals to Law Enforcement
The more difficult question is whether and how recent reforms affect
Fourth Amendment standards for searches by school officials who, pursuant
to state and local policies, turn over the fruits of those searches to SROs. This
question is particularly important because school officials can, under T.L.O.,
conduct many searches of students without having probable cause or a
warrant, and courts have generally approved such searches even when, by
policy or interagency agreement, the fruits of such searches are turned over
to law enforcement.366
Moreover, following this Article’s argument would create an incentive for
school officials to conduct even more searches because they could arguably
take advantage of T.L.O. while SROs could not. Indeed, in jurisdictions that
have followed the minority rule and held SROs to a higher Fourth
Amendment standard, the precise result has been “a system in which [school]
administrators are conducting most searches and questioning youth” and then
School
turning over evidence of crimes to law enforcement.367
administrators take advantage of the T.L.O. standard to search a broader set
of students than SROs could, with SROs likely engaging in willful
blindness—keeping themselves away from school administrator searches so
they do not taint administrators’ ability to search with the lower standard, and
knowing that they can receive the fruits of such searches.368
Courts have noted this dynamic and offered disapproving language,369 but
they do not always act on that disapproval. One Colorado case, In re
P.E.A.,370 presented a particularly clear example of a police officer seeking
to evade Fourth Amendment requirements by prompting school officials to
conduct a search. There, a regular police officer (not even an SRO) received
a tip that several children were involved in selling marijuana at a local school,
and the officer, who did not have probable cause to arrest the children,
informed the school of the tip “with the intent to instigate an investigation by
school officials.”371 An investigation ensued, and the Colorado Supreme
Court deemed the school officials’ subsequent search of one of the suspect’s
cars to be a school search under T.L.O. because, the court reasoned, no
agency relationship existed between the police officer and school officials.372
In another case, a New Hampshire appellate court ruled for a defendant when
366. See supra notes 120–21, 173–83 and accompanying text.
367. Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement
Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 1009 (2010).
368. See id. (describing how “[m]ost SROs were also aware that they needed to keep a
physical and visual distance from the school administrator during searches” so that the
administrators are not “viewed as ‘agents of the police’”).
369. See, e.g., State v. Burdette, 225 P.3d 736, 740 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (“[W]e note that
school officials’ power to search students cannot be used to cloak what is normally a police
function performed by or at the behest of law enforcement officers.”).
370. 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988).
371. Id. at 385.
372. Id. at 385–86.
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an SRO who lacked probable cause referred an investigation to school
officials who, pursuant to a “silent understanding,” would conduct the
investigation and share any contraband with the officer373—a more
principled analysis than the Colorado case.
Such searches—both when school officials act following information
provided by law enforcement and when school officials search for evidence
of a crime and turn over such evidence pursuant to an agreement with law
enforcement—should not qualify for T.L.O.’s standard for multiple reasons.
First, T.L.O.’s standard seeks to help school officials maintain school
discipline, not to help police officers escape Fourth Amendment limits by
inducing school officials to conduct law enforcement investigations. More
generally, such searches are too intertwined with law enforcement to qualify
as special needs searches. This argument rests heavily on Ferguson v. City
of Charleston and other special needs cases discussed in Part I.D. Those
cases establish that the question is not whether school officials have become
agents of law enforcement, as the Colorado Supreme Court asked in In re
P.E.A., but whether the relationship between schools and law enforcement
makes it impossible to disentangle school disciplinary special needs from the
normal need for criminal law enforcement. When a school official suspects
a child possesses a small amount of marijuana374 and searches the child under
a policy and MOU that requires the official to refer any evidence of any
illegal drug use to the SRO, then that search looks a lot like the hospital urine
screens turned over to law enforcement in Ferguson. Such policies have long
been commonplace,375 and the reforms discussed in Part III do not change
those reporting policies.
The clearer demarcation between school discipline and law enforcement
that is the hallmark of reforms discussed in Part III helps demonstrate these
searches’ law enforcement purposes.376 School-to-prison pipeline reforms
create a sharp line between SROs and other law enforcement and school
discipline. MOUs that simultaneously draw that sharp line and direct school
officials to cross that line by reporting evidence of certain crimes to law
enforcement transform these searches from a school-discipline search to a
law enforcement search. Otherwise, there is little reason to involve the SRO,
and whatever action the school official is taking is no longer pursuing a
“special need[], beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”377 That was
precisely the Supreme Court’s holding in Ferguson—that an agreement
requiring non-law-enforcement officials to turn evidence of a crime over to
police renders T.L.O.’s special needs test inapplicable.378
373. State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634, 637 (N.H. 2001).
374. If a school official searches a child based on suspicion of only a school rule violation
and discovers evidence of a crime, that is a different matter. The purpose of the search itself
is what determines whether the special needs doctrine applies.
375. See Kagan, supra note 144, at 307–10.
376. See supra Part III.
377. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
378. See supra notes 152–73 and accompanying text.
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This scenario should make for an easier case than the New Hampshire case
involving a “silent understanding” between the SRO and school officials.379
There, the trial court had to determine if school officials searched a student
at an SRO’s behest and whether this amounted to “‘a mere wink or nod’ or
something more concrete.”380 Clear policies that require school officials to
turn over evidence of crimes to SROs provides concrete proof of law
enforcement entanglement. In such situations, the state cannot justify a claim
that the school officials acted only in furtherance of school discipline; they
have “agree[d]”—via the agreements or policies at issue—“to take on the
mantle of criminal investigation and enforcement,” and so must follow
search and seizure standards applicable to law enforcement.381
C. Policy Benefits of a Doctrinal Shift: Incentives to Limit
the School-to-Prison Pipeline
Excluding school searches entangled with law enforcement from the
T.L.O. rule serves important policy purposes that help respond to the
concerns about the school-to-prison pipeline discussed in Part II. Consistent
with prevailing criticisms of the school-to-prison pipeline, this exclusion
recognizes that the consequences of searches matter and that the
consequences of turning relatively minor misdeeds into law enforcement
matters are often harmful to children.
This Article’s proposed rule forces school districts to make a choice—if
they wish to maintain the freedom to search students without a warrant or
probable cause, then they must choose how to keep such searches focused on
school discipline and their subjects out of the juvenile and criminal justice
systems. They could choose, like the school districts in Acton and Earls, to
search students but avoid referring the results of such searches to law
enforcement.382 If there are situations so serious that law enforcement
involvement is desired, then schools should surrender use of the T.L.O.
exception; having made the choice to refer a category of situations to law
enforcement, there should be no pretending that resulting searches only serve
school disciplinary goals.
This policy choice is consistent with post-T.L.O. cases’ focus on the
“programmatic” purposes of searches.383 That focus imposes Fourth
Amendment consequences on policymakers’ deliberate programmatic or
policy choices, and those consequences provide some incentives to limit the
most coercive powers of government control over individuals. It places a
modest weight on the scale in favor of a less law-enforcement-heavy
response, which, especially in the school setting, would be a good result for
all of the reasons discussed in Part II.B. More modest and practical benefits
of forcing such policy choices exist too—a state or local policy describing
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634, 637 (N.H. 2001).
Id. at 641 (quoting State v. Bruneau, 552 A.2d 585, 588 (N.H. 1988)).
Id. at 640.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
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when SROs may search students and when school officials may do so and
refer the evidence to law enforcement would likely impose some modest
limits on such searches and thus balance their value with the harms of law
enforcement referrals and the privacy invasions of such searches.384
V. WHAT ABOUT SCHOOL SHOOTINGS?: A CALL FOR A SCHOOL-SPECIFIC
STANDARD FOR TERRY SEARCHES RATHER THAN ANY SEARCH
While schools remain generally safe locations for children,385 any effort
to make it more difficult to search students will undoubtedly raise concerns
of undermining authorities’ ability to protect schoolchildren from mass
shootings and other gun violence. Indeed, I started writing this Article in the
aftermath of the February 2018 school shooting in Parkland, Florida, and
continued work during the Santa Fe, Texas, school shooting in May 2018,
and it is reasonable to fear that further mass shootings may occur at one or
more schools by the time it reaches publication. Moreover, less high-profile
school shootings occur on a more frequent basis.386 While it is easy to
exaggerate the threats to children at school, it is widely accepted that any
shootings and the threat or fear of such shootings in schools is unacceptable.
This Part outlines a response to these concerns: When authorities suspect
the potential of deadly violence at school, then courts can craft a doctrinal
path to permit limited searches to serve that goal. Doing so would rely on a
narrower doctrine than applying T.L.O. to all SRO-involved searches and
thus would limit the risk that such doctrine would trigger the school-to-prison
pipeline concerns described in Part II.B.
When faced with suspicions that a student may have brought a weapon to
school—from, for instance, a tip from another student—but unsure whether
grounds for a warrant exist, what should school officials or SROs do? Their
evidence may not provide probable cause, but the suspicion is of the utmost
seriousness. The analytically easy first step is that authorities—school
officials or law enforcement—should investigate more. An investigation
may clarify that there is no threat or provide probable cause that a particular
child has a weapon in a particular location, supporting a warrant to search
that location387 or, depending on the details, that there no warrant is required
due to exigent circumstances. Less powerful evidence might establish
reasonable suspicion that a child has a dangerous weapon on his person,
which would justify a limited Terry search for that weapon.388
384. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 416–19 (1974); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 171, at 403.
385. See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 306, at 16.
386. See John Woodrow Cox et al., More than 220,000 Students Have Experienced Gun
Violence at School Since Columbine, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/school-shootings-database/
[https://perma.cc/A6EK-49LW] (compiling school shooting data).
387. See 5 LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 10.11(b), at 604–05, nn.44–58 (concluding that most
reported cases involve facts sufficiently strong to meet probable cause, even when they depend
on student informants).
388. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Terry is one appropriate vehicle for such searches because it was intended
to allow protective searches in response to the unique threat from firearms
and the “extraordinary dangers” they can present.389 It applies, of course, to
law enforcement, and thus it applies to SROs even after they are properly
recognized as law enforcement officers rather than school officials.
Even so, there may be some situations which do not satisfy even the lower
standard of Terry and yet call for some kind of measures to ensure safety. As
the Florida Court of Appeals wrote in 2011, “Allegations of gun possession
on school campuses are different from traditional Fourth Amendment
cases . . . because of the seriousness of the threat, the location of the threat,
[and] the vulnerability and number of potential victims . . . .”390 The Court
has suggested such an approach in Florida v. J.L.391—“extraordinary dangers
sometimes justify unusual precautions.”392 In J.L., the Court held that a
search on a public street could not meet the standards for a Terry stop but
suggested that the same facts at a school could support “protective searches
on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.”393
Where J.L. suggested something less than reasonable suspicion of a firearm
might support protective searches at schools, the Fourth Circuit held that the
“dire” implications of a firearm at a school justified an expanded scope of
searches and seizures permitted by Terry.394 The court upheld the detention
a student suspected of bringing a gun to school in the principal’s office until
school and law enforcement authorities had determined no such gun was
present.395 In such circumstances, warrantless searches based only on
reasonable suspicion would be justified.
That analysis is untouched by the argument in this Article. Unlike the
broader school-search framework, an emergency school search does not
depend on either a purely school disciplinary purpose or the role of SROs.
The J.L Court’s suggestion is based on the particular vulnerability of schools
to violence, the extreme dangers posed by firearms (or other weapons capable
of killing or injuring many individuals in short periods of time), and the
state’s special obligation to protect schoolchildren from such harm. This
flexible Terry analysis is particularly appropriate in school searches for
firearms because a school “is a special kind of place in which serious and

389. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).
390. M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d 563, 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); see also In re J.D., 170
Cal. Rptr. 3d 464, 466–67 (Ct. App. 2014) (describing particular danger of guns at school).
M.D. also stated that “the lessened expectation of privacy of students” justified a search in
such cases. M.D., 65 So. 3d at 565. For reasons discussed in Parts I.B. and I.C.2, cases
approving various searches of students do not categorically hold that children always have a
lessened expectation of privacy at school.
391. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
392. Id. at 272.
393. Id. at 274.
394. Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 318, 327 (4th Cir. 2004).
395. Id.
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dangerous wrongdoing is intolerable,” which weighs in favor of searches
narrowly intended to prevent such dangerous events.396
In such cases, the immediacy and severity of the threat justify a search,
even with later law enforcement consequences. The same cannot be said for
a student suspected of possessing a small amount of marijuana. The best way
doctrinally to distinguish the two is to follow the rules for Terry stops within
schools. Then, when a weapon is suspected, a lesser standard than probable
cause is required and, as the Court suggested in J.L., when particularly
serious and immediate dangers are suspected, courts could permit a broader
range of Terry searches than would be permissible in other public places.
These searches would be limited “in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place”397—it would justify a search for
a deadly weapon, but not a more invasive search. As importantly, it would
not justify searches for less immediate dangers.
One case illustrates how this doctrinal shift would preserve authorities’
ability to protect schools without contributing so significantly to the schoolto-prison pipeline. In re Ana E.398 involved a child who got into a fight with
another child, remained agitated after the fight, and threatened to “make the
other student bleed.”399 When a school official retrieved the student’s
backpack from a classroom, other students were reluctant to give it to her and
one said she should not search it.400 School officials suspected that the bag
contained a weapon and were particularly concerned that, given the student’s
agitation and threat to the child with whom she had just fought, she might
use any such weapon. For all the reasons explained in this Article, other
courts should not follow the Ana E. court’s blanket holding that reasonable
suspicion applies to any search of a student conducted by an SRO. But Terry
would justify seizing the backpack given the immediacy and severity of the
safety risk at issue.
Applying Terry (with J.L.’s gloss) but not T.L.O. both enables police to
prevent the immediate risk of severe violence while ensuring searches are
related to the specific risk, not to a broader and more amorphous concern
about school discipline. It thus provides a more focused doctrinal path to
keep schools safe from severe violence while mitigating the risk of
broadening the school-to-prison pipeline. That is far more focused than
giving SROs or school officials working closely with them carte blanche to
search for evidence of a wide range of minor offenses.
CONCLUSION
The present decade has seen many promising reforms of the school-toprison pipeline, especially reforms to keep SROs out of school discipline and
396. 5 LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 10.11(b), at 601 (quoting People v. D., 315 N.E.2d 466,
486 (N.Y. 1974)).
397. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
398. No. D-10378/01, 2002 WL 264325, at *11 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Jan. 14, 2002).
399. Id. at *11.
400. Id.
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thus reduce the number of incidents in which law enforcement involvement
can transform school disciplinary matters into delinquency cases. Other
elements of the pipeline remain in need of reform, including the rule applied
in a majority of states permitting SROs to use reduced Fourth Amendment
standards to search students at school.
Most state courts have upheld school searches entangled with law
enforcement based on a particular understanding of SROs’ roles. In Fourth
Amendment cases, courts conceived of SROs as either entirely equivalent to
school officials or as functionally equivalent—that when they were involved
in searches, it was to assist school officials and, implicitly, their involvement
did not change the character of the search and justified application of T.L.O.’s
relaxed search standard. This analysis drew a line between SROs and other
law enforcement officers based on the idea that SROs’ unique duties and
collaboration with school officials made their searches more like school
officials’ searches than law enforcement searches. This line ignored the law
enforcement consequences that flowed from such searches, but it did reflect
the reality that SROs acted for both school disciplinary and law enforcement
purposes. That reality was reflected in rules empowering SROs to impose
school disciplinary consequences and policies and practices permitting SROs
to become involved in school disciplinary matters.
More recent reforms have drawn a new line between school officials and
SROs. The former are the primary actors responsible for a school’s learning
environment and school discipline, with a range of authorities limiting when
SROs can become involved. SRO involvement is limited to more traditional
police action—to enforce criminal laws and respond to incidents that threaten
the immediate safety of one or more people (incidents that often, if not
usually, involve some kind of criminal law violation). Where this new line
exists—it is well developed in some jurisdictions, and emerging in others—
it requires a reevaluation of Fourth Amendment law. This line shows that
courts can no longer rationally see SROs as school officials, and it shows that
involving SROs transforms an investigation from school discipline to law
enforcement. This line clarifies that the programmatic purpose of SROinvolved searches is to enforce criminal law and that normal Fourth
Amendment standards governing law enforcement must apply.

